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Zusammenfassung
Digitale Signaturen sind von wesentlicher Bedeutung fu¨r die Sicherheit von Compu-
ternetzwerken wie dem Internet. Digitale Signaturen werden zum Beispiel eingesetzt,
um die Authentizita¨t und Integrita¨t von Updates fu¨r Betriebssysteme und andere
Software-Anwendungen zu gewa¨hrleisten. Die Sicherheit der wenigen in der Praxis
eingesetzen Signaturverfahren ist durch Quantencomputer bedroht. Alle derzeit ver-
wendeten Signaturverfahren werden unsicher, sobald große Quantencomputer ge-
baut werden ko¨nnen. Die Erforschung von alternativen Signaturverfahren, welche
Angriffen durch Quantencomputer standhalten und konkurrenzfa¨hig zu den heute
verwendeten Verfahren sind, ist daher von sehr großer Bedeutung.
Ein viel versprechender Kandidat fu¨r ein Signaturverfahren, dass sicher gegen
Angriffe durch Quantencomputer ist, ist das im Jahre 1979 von Merkle erfundene
Merkle-Signaturverfahren. Allerdings hatte das Merkle-Signaturverfahren, selbst in
Kombination mit den Verbesserungen von Szydlo und Coronado Effizienzprobleme,
die es davon abgehalten haben wirklich praktisch zu sein. Zuna¨chst einmal sind die
Signierzeiten sehr unbalanciert. Signieren dauert im Worst-Case wesentlich la¨nger
als im Average-Case. Weiter produziert das Merkle–Szydlo–Coronado-Signaturver-
fahren sehr große Signaturen. Ebenfalls ist unklar ob Merkles Signaturverfahren in
ressourcenbeschra¨nkten Gera¨ten einsetzbar ist.
Diese Arbeit pra¨sentiert das
”
generalized Merkle signature scheme“ (GMSS), ein
Signaturverfahren, welches die oben genannten Probleme lo¨st. GMSS hat eine signi-
fikant bessere Worst-Case-Signierzeit als das Merkle–Szydlo–Coronado-Signaturver-
fahren. Die Worst-Case-Signierzeit von GMSS entspricht der Average-Case-Signier-
zeit des Merkle–Szydlo–Coronado-Signaturverfahrens. Weiter ist die Worst-Case-
Signierzeit von GMSS sehr nah an seiner Average-Case-Signierzeit. Damit stellt
GMSS balancierte Zeiten fu¨r die Signaturerzeugung zur Verfu¨gung. GMSS nutzt die
verbesserten Signierzeiten, um die Gro¨ße der Signaturen spu¨rbar zu verringern und
bewahrt dabei Zeiten, die konkurrenzfa¨hig zu den heute verwendeten Signaturver-
fahren sind. Eine Implementierung auf einem Microcontroller zeigt, dass GMSS auch
in ressourcenbeschra¨nkten Gera¨ten einsetzbar ist. Diese Arbeit beschreibt weiterhin
eine neue Konstruktionsmethode fu¨r Merkle Signaturen. Die neue Konstruktion ist
beweisbar sicher unter schwa¨cheren Sicherheitsannahmen und liefert ein Signaturver-
fahren mit signifikant ho¨herem Sicherheitsniveau im Vergleich zu der urspru¨nglichen
Konstruktion.
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Abstract
Digital signatures are essential for the security of computer networks such as the
Internet. For example, digital signatures are widely used to ensure the authenticity
and integrity of updates for operating systems and other software applications. The
security of the few practically used signature schemes is threatened by quantum
computers. When large quantum computers are built, all currently used signature
schemes will become insecure. It is therefore of extreme importance to develop alter-
native signature schemes that remain secure in the presence of quantum computers
and which are able to compete with currently used signature schemes.
A very promising candidate for a signature scheme that withstands quantum com-
puter attacks is the Merkle signature scheme invented by Merkle in 1979. However,
even combined with the improvements by Szydlo and Coronado, the Merkle signa-
ture scheme has certain efficiency drawbacks that keep it from being truly practi-
cal. First of all, it has highly unbalanced signature generation times. In the worst
case, signature generation takes significantly longer than on average. Secondly,
the Merkle–Szydlo–Coronado signature scheme produces very large signatures. It
is also unclear if Merkle’s signature scheme is suitable for application on resource
constrained devices.
The generalized Merkle signature scheme (GMSS) presented in this thesis solves
the problems mentioned above. It drastically reduces the worst case signature gen-
eration time of the Merkle–Szydlo–Coronado signature scheme. The worst case
signature generation time of GMSS corresponds to the average case signature gen-
eration time of the Merkle–Szydlo–Coronado signature scheme. Further, the worst
case signature generation time of GMSS is extremely close to its average case signa-
ture generation time and thus, GMSS provides balanced timings for the signature
generation. GMSS exploits the improved signature generation times to provide a
noticeable reduction of the signature sizes while maintaining timings that are highly
competitive to currently used signature schemes. A proof-of-concept implementation
shows that GMSS can also be used on resource constrained devices and excellently
compares to currently used signature schemes. This thesis also introduces a new con-
struction method for Merkle signatures. This construction is provably secure under
weaker security assumptions and yields a signature scheme with a significantly higher
security level compared to the original construction.
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1 Introduction
Digital signatures are extremely important for the security of computer networks
such as the Internet. For example, digital signatures are widely used to ensure
the authenticity and integrity of updates for operating systems and other software
applications. Currently used signature schemes like RSA [33] and ECDSA [24] base
their security on number theoretic problems. The security of RSA is based on the
difficulty of factoring large composite numbers. The security of ECDSA is based on
the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in the group of points on an elliptic
curve. Currently, the factoring problem is intractable for composite numbers larger
than 21024 and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is intractable for groups
of order larger than 2160. In 1994, Shor proposed a quantum algorithm that is able
to solve the factoring and discrete logarithm problem in polynomial time [38]. As
a result, RSA and ECDSA will be completely broken when large scale quantum
computers are built. But quantum computers are not the only threat to the security
of RSA and ECDSA. New and unexpected ideas can always lead to more efficient
algorithms to solve the underlying problems. For example, in the past 30 years,
there has been tremendous progress in solving the factorization problem. As a
result, alternative signature schemes that withstand quantum computer attacks are
urgently required as replacements for RSA and ECDSA to ensure the security of
IT infrastructures in the future. Such signature schemes are called post-quantum
signature schemes. Post-quantum signature schemes must not only be resistant
against quantum computer attacks, but also as efficient as currently used signature
schemes and suitable for all applications where digital signatures are required.
A very promising post-quantum signature scheme is the Merkle signature scheme
(MSS) invented by Merkle in 1979 [30]. The Merkle signature scheme uses a hash
based one-time signature scheme to sign documents and a complete binary hash
tree, also called a Merkle tree, to reduce the validity of many one-time verification
keys to the validity of a single public key, the root of the Merkle tree. Like any
other digital signature scheme, the Merkle signature scheme uses a cryptographic
hash function. However, additional number theoretic assumptions are not required
by the Merkle signature scheme. Its security solely relies on the cryptographic prop-
erties of the hash function. In fact, the Merkle signature scheme is provably secure
assuming certain cryptographic properties of the hash function. Coronado showed
that the Merkle signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive cho-
sen message attacks, if the underlying hash function is collision resistant and the
used one-time signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen
message attacks [14]. The best known quantum algorithm to break cryptographic
properties of hash functions is the Grover algorithm [21]. Contrary to Shor’s algo-
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rithm, which speeds up factoring and computing discrete logarithms exponentially,
applying Grover’s algorithm results only in a square-root speed-up of generic attacks
used to break cryptographic properties of hash functions. As a result, the security
of hash functions and therefore the security of the Merkle signature scheme is only
marginally affected when large quantum computers are built. Another benefit of
the Merkle signature scheme is, that each new cryptographic hash function yields a
new signature scheme. If a hash function is found insecure – which happened in the
past [45, 46] and is likely to happen in the future – the Merkle signature scheme is
easily repaired by using a new and secure hash function.
At first, the Merkle signature scheme didn’t receive much attention because it
had severe efficiency drawbacks. This changed in recent years when many improve-
ments for the Merkle signature scheme were proposed. Especially the contributions
by Szydlo [23, 42] and Coronado [10, 13] helped to improve the performance of the
Merkle signature scheme. However, even with these improvements the Merkle sig-
nature scheme still has certain drawbacks that keep it from being truly practical.
First of all, the signature generation times are highly unbalanced. In the worst case,
signature generation takes significantly longer than on average. Secondly, the sig-
natures produced by the Merkle–Szydlo–Coronado signature scheme are very large.
Finally, it is unclear if Merkle’s signature scheme is suitable for application on re-
source constrained devices.
This thesis provides solutions to the problems mentioned above. Two enhance-
ments that drastically reduce the worst case signature generation time of the Merkle–
Szydlo–Coronado signature scheme are presented. The signature scheme that com-
bines these enhancements is called generalized Merkle signature scheme (GMSS).
The worst case signature generation time of GMSS corresponds to the average case
signature generation time of the Merkle–Szydlo–Coronado signature scheme. Fur-
ther, the worst case signature generation time of GMSS is extremely close to its
average case signature generation time and thus GMSS provides balanced timings
for the signature generation. The first enhancement is a new algorithm for the com-
putation of authentication paths [12]. The new algorithm has a significantly better
worst case runtime than the best known algorithm for computing authentication
paths, that is the algorithm proposed by Szydlo [43]. The difference to Szydlo’s
algorithm is that the Merkle tree nodes that must be computed are divided into two
categories: leaves and inner nodes. Focusing on the computation of leaves, instead
of tree nodes in general, leads to reduced worst case cost for the authentication path
generation and therefore the signature generation. The second enhancement is the
method of distributed signature generation [11]. This method drastically reduces
the worst case signature generation time of Coronado’s tree chaining method [10].
The idea of the distributed signature generation is based on the observation that
most parts of the tree chaining signatures change only infrequently. The computa-
tion of these parts is not done at once, but distributed evenly across several steps.
The improved signature generation time obtained by applying both enhancements
is exploited to provide a noticeable reduction of the signature sizes using the Win-
ternitz time-memory trade-off (see Section 2.1.2), while maintaining timings that
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are highly competitive to currently used signature schemes. The practicability of
both enhancements is substantiated by two implementations. The first is a JCA
conform Java implementation included in the FlexiProvider [20]. The second is an
implementation on an 8-bit AVR microcontroller [34]. These implementations show
that GMSS is highly competitive to RSA and ECDSA and that it is possible to
integrate the Merkle signature scheme in resource constrained devices.
As mentioned above, one advantage of the Merkle signature scheme is that it
is provably secure. Its existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message
attacks can be reduced to cryptographic properties of the hash function. Based
on Coronado’s work [13, 14], this thesis states a security reduction to the preimage
resistance and collision resistance of the hash function. Then, the security level of the
Merkle signature scheme for certain output lengths of the hash function is estimated.
The downside is that the security level of the Merkle signature scheme corresponds to
the security level of the collision resistance property which is rather low compared
to the security level of other cryptographic properties of hash functions, such as
preimage resistance and second preimage resistance. Also, when hash functions
are cryptanalyzed the collision resistance property is usually targeted first [45, 46].
It is therefore desirable to be able to reduce the existential unforgeability of the
Merkle signature scheme under adaptive chosen message attacks to cryptographic
properties of hash functions that provide a higher security level. This thesis shows
how this can be accomplished. A new construction method for Merkle trees is
introduced that yields a signature scheme existentially unforgeable under adaptive
chosen message attacks, if the used hash function is preimage resistant and second
preimage resistant [17]. Since second preimage resistance has a higher security level
than collision resistance, the new scheme also has a higher security level than the
original Merkle signature scheme.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the Merkle
signature scheme. Chapter 3 presents the new authentication path algorithm. Chap-
ter 4 introduces the method of distributed signature generation. Chapter 5 states
timings and sizes of two implementations. Chapter 6 deals with the provably secu-
rity of the Merkle signature scheme and introduces the new construction method for
Merkle trees. Chapter 7 states the author’s conclusion and future research topics.
3
2 The Merkle signature scheme
This chapter describes the basics of the Merkle signature scheme (MSS) and defines
the notation used throughout this thesis. Section 2.1 introduces hash-based one-time
signature schemes (OTS). Section 2.2 reviews Merkle’s tree authentication scheme,
that converts any one-time signature scheme into a multi-time signature scheme.
Section 2.3 describes a space efficient algorithm for the construction of Merkle trees.
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 describe efficiency improvements for MSS.
2.1 One-time signature schemes
This section introduces two hash-based one-time signature schemes (OTS). The first
is the Lamport–Diffie one-time signature scheme (LD-OTS) proposed in [25]. The
second is the Winternitz one-time signature scheme (W-OTS). It is an improvement
of the LD-OTS and provides a trade-off between the signature generation time and
the signature size [16, 30]. One-time signature schemes are digital signature schemes
whose signature key is allowed to be used only once. This is because parts of the
signature key are revealed with the signature. If a signature key is used twice, an
attacker can combine the parts of the signature key contained in those signatures
to generate a valid signature for a third digest. This is illustrated in Examples 2.2
and 2.4.
2.1.1 The Lamport–Diffie one-time signature scheme
Let n be a positive integer, the security parameter of the Lamport–Diffie one-time
signature scheme (LD-OTS). LD-OTS uses a one-way function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n,
and a cryptographic hash function
g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
LD-OTS key pair generation. The signature key X of LD-OTS consists of 2n bit
strings of length n chosen uniformly at random,
X =
(
xn−1[0], xn−1[1], . . . , x1[0], x1[1], x0[0], x0[1]
)
∈R {0, 1}
(n,2n). (2.1)
The LD-OTS verification key Y is
Y =
(
yn−1[0], yn−1[1], . . . , y1[0], y1[1], y0[0], y0[1]
)
∈ {0, 1}(n,2n), (2.2)
4
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where
yi[j] = f
(
xi[j]
)
, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, j = 0, 1. (2.3)
So LD-OTS key generation requires 2n evaluations of f . The signature and verifi-
cation keys are 2n bit strings of length n.
LD-OTS signature generation. A document M ∈ {0, 1}∗ is signed using LD-OTS
with a signature key X as in Equation (2.1). Let g(M) = d = (dn−1, . . . , d0) be the
message digest of M . Then the LD-OTS signature is
σ =
(
xn−1[dn−1], . . . , x1[d1], x0[d0]
)
∈ {0, 1}(n,n). (2.4)
This signature is a sequence of n bit strings, each of length n. They are chosen as a
function of the message digest d. The ith bit string in this signature is xi[0] if the
ith bit in d is 0 and vice versa. Signing requires no evaluations of f . The length of
the signature is n2 bits.
LD-OTS signature verification. To verify a signature σ = (σn−1, . . . , σ0) of M
as in (2.4), the verifier calculates the message digest d = (dn−1, . . . , d0). Then he
checks whether (
f(σn−1), . . . , f(σ0)
)
=
(
yn−1[dn−1], . . . , y0[d0]
)
. (2.5)
Signature verification requires n evaluations of f .
Example 2.1. Let n = 3, f : {0, 1}3 → {0, 1}3, x 7→ x+1 mod 8, and let d = (1, 0, 1)
be the hash value of a message M . We choose the signature key
X =
(
x2[0], x2[1], x1[0], x1[1], x0[0], x0[1]
)
=

 1 0 0 1 1 01 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0

 ∈ {0, 1}(3,6)
and compute the corresponding verification key
Y =
(
y2[0], y2[1], y1[0], y1[1], y0[0], y0[1]
)
=

 0 0 1 1 1 00 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1

 ∈ {0, 1}(3,6).
The signature of d = (1, 0, 1) is
σ = (σ2, σ1, σ0) = (x2[1], x1[0], x0[1]) =

 0 0 00 1 1
0 1 0

 ∈ {0, 1}(3,3)
Example 2.2. We give an example to illustrate why the signature keys of LD-OTS
must be used only once. Let n = 4. Suppose the signer signs two messages with
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digests d1 = (1, 0, 1, 1) and d2 = (1, 1, 1, 0) using the same signature key. The
signatures of these digests are
σ1 = (x3[1], x2[0], x1[1], x0[1]) and σ2 = (x3[1], x2[1], x1[1], x0[0]),
respectively. Then an attacker knows x3[1], x2[0], x2[1], x1[1], x0[0], x0[1] from the
signature key. He can use this information to generate valid signatures for messages
with digests d3 = (1, 0, 1, 0) and d4 = (1, 1, 1, 1). This example can be generalized
to arbitrary security parameters n. Also, the attacker is only able to generate valid
signatures for certain digests. As long as the hash function used to compute the
message digest is cryptographically secure, he cannot find appropriate messages.
2.1.2 The Winternitz one-time signature scheme
The Winternitz OTS (W-OTS) explained in the following produces significantly
shorter signatures than the LD-OTS. The idea is to use one string in the one-time
signature key to simultaneously sign several bits in the message digest. Like LD-
OTS, W-OTS uses a one-way function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
and a cryptographic hash function
g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
W-OTS key pair generation. A Winternitz parameter w ≥ 2 is selected which is
the number of bits to be signed simultaneously. Then
t1 =
⌈ n
w
⌉
, t2 =
⌈
⌊log2 t1⌋+ 1 + w
w
⌉
, t = t1 + t2. (2.6)
are determined. The signature key X is
X =
(
xt−1, . . . , x1, x0
)
∈R {0, 1}
(n,t). (2.7)
where the bit strings xi are chosen uniformly at random.
The verification key Y is computed by applying f to each bit string in the signature
key 2w − 1 times. So we have
Y =
(
yt−1, . . . , y1, y0
)
∈ {0, 1}(n,t), (2.8)
where
yi = f
2w−1
(
xi
)
, 0 ≤ i ≤ t− 1. (2.9)
Key generation requires t(2w − 1) evaluations of f and the lengths of the signature
and verification key are t · n bits, respectively.
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W-OTS signature generation. A message M with message digest g(M) = d =
(dn−1, . . . , d0) is signed. First, a minimum number of zeros is prepended to d such
that the length of d is divisible by w. The extended string d is split into t1 bit strings
bt−1, . . . , bt−t1 of length w. Then
d = bt−1 ‖ . . . ‖ bt−t1 , (2.10)
where ‖ denotes concatenation. Next, the bit strings bi are identified with integers
in {0, 1, . . . , 2w − 1} and the checksum
c =
t−1∑
i=t−t1
(2w − bi) (2.11)
is calculated. Since c ≤ t12
w, the length of the binary representation of c is less than
⌊log2 t12
w⌋+ 1 = ⌊log2 t1⌋+ w + 1. (2.12)
A minimum number of zeros is prepended to this binary representation such that
the length of the extended string is divisible by w. The extended string is split into
t2 blocks bt2−1, . . . , b0 of length w. Then
c = bt2−1|| . . . ||b0.
Finally the signature of M is computed as
σ =
(
f bt−1(xt−1), . . . , f
b1(x1), f
b0(x0)
)
. (2.13)
In the worst case, signature generation requires t(2w − 1) evaluations of f . The
W-OTS signature size is t · n.
W-OTS signature verification. For the verification of an Winternitz signature
σ = (σt−1, . . . , σ0) the bit strings bt−1, . . . , b0 are calculated as explained above.
Then we check if(
f2
w−1−bt−1(σn−1), . . . , f
2w−1−b0(σ0)
)
=
(
yn−1, . . . , y0
)
. (2.14)
If the signature is valid, then σi = f
bi(xi) and therefore
f2
w−1−bi(σi) = f
2w−1(xi) = yi (2.15)
holds for i = t− 1, . . . , 0. In the worst case, signature verification requires t(2w − 1)
evaluations of f .
Example 2.3. Let n = 3, w = 2, f : {0, 1}3 → {0, 1}3, x 7→ x + 1 mod 8 and
d = (1, 0, 0). We get t1 = 2, t2 = 2, and t = 4. We choose the signature key as
X =
(
x3, x2, x1, x0
)
=

 1 0 0 11 0 1 1
1 0 1 0

 ∈ {0, 1}(3,4)
7
2 The Merkle signature scheme
and compute the verification key by applying f three times to the bit strings in X:
Y =
(
y3, y2, y1, y0
)
=

 0 0 1 01 1 1 0
0 1 0 1

 ∈ {0, 1}(3,4).
Prepending one zero to d and splitting the extended string into blocks of length 2
yields d = 01||00. The checksum c is c = (4 − 1) + (4 − 0) = 7. Prepending one
zero to the binary representation of c and splitting the extended string into blocks of
length 2 yields c = 01||11. The signature is
σ = (σ3, σ2, σ1, σ0) =
(
f(x3), x2, f(x1), f
3(x0)
)
=

 0 0 1 10 0 0 1
0 0 0 1

 ∈ {0, 1}(3,4).
The signature is verified by computing
(
f2(σ3), f
3(σ2), f
2(σ1), σ0
)
=

 0 0 1 01 1 1 0
0 1 0 1

 ∈ {0, 1}(3,4)
and comparing it with the verification key Y .
Example 2.4. We give an example to illustrate why the signature keys of the
W-OTS must be used only once. Let w = 2. Suppose the signer signs two mes-
sages with digests d1 = (1, 0, 0) and d2 = (1, 1, 1) using the same signature key. The
signatures of these digests are
σ1 =
(
f(x3), x2, f(x1), f
3(x0)
)
and σ2 =
(
f(x3), f
3(x2), f(x1), x0
)
,
respectively. The attacker can use this information to compute the signature for mes-
sages with digest d3 = (1, 1, 0) given as σ3 =
(
f(x3), f
2(x2), f(x1), f(x0)
)
. Again
this example can be generalized to arbitrary security parameters n. Also, the at-
tacker can only produce valid signatures for certain digests. As long as the hash
function used to compute the message digest is cryptographically secure, he cannot
find appropriate messages.
2.2 Merkle’s tree authentication scheme
The one-time signature schemes introduced in the last section are inadequate for
most practical situations since each key pair can only be used for one signature. In
1979 Ralph Merkle proposed a solution to this problem [30]. His idea is to use a
complete binary hash tree to reduce the validity of an arbitrary but fixed number
of one-time verification keys to the validity of one single public key, the root of the
hash tree.
The Merkle signature scheme (MSS) works with any cryptographic hash function
and any one-time signature scheme. For the explanation we let g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n
be a cryptographic hash function. We also assume that a one-time signature scheme
has been selected.
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ν0[0] ν0[1] ν0[2] ν0[3] ν0[4] ν0[5] ν0[6] ν0[7]
ν1[0] ν1[1] ν1[2] ν1[3]
ν2[0] ν2[1]
ν3[0]
X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7
Y0 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7
Figure 2.1: A Merkle tree of height H = 3
MSS key pair generation. The signer selects H ∈ N, H ≥ 2. Then the key pair
to be generated will be able to sign/verify 2H documents1. The signer generates 2H
one-time key pairs (Xj , Yj), 0 ≤ j < 2
H . Here Xj is the signature key and Yj is
the verification key. They are both bit strings. The leaves of the Merkle tree are
the digests g(Yj), 0 ≤ j < 2
H . The inner nodes of the Merkle tree are computed
according to the following construction rule: a parent node is the hash value of the
concatenation of its left and right children. The MSS public key is the root of the
Merkle tree. The MSS private key is the sequence of the 2H one-time signature keys.
To be more precise, denote the nodes in the Merkle tree by νh[j], 0 ≤ j < 2
H−h,
where h ∈ {0, . . . , H} is the height of the node. Then
νh[j] = g(νh−1[2j] ‖ νh−1[2j + 1]), 1 ≤ h ≤ H, 0 ≤ j < 2
H−h. (2.16)
Figure 2.1 shows an example for H = 3. MSS key pair generation requires the
computation of 2H one-time key pairs and 2H+1−1 evaluations of the hash function.
MSS signature generation. MSS uses the one-time signature keys successively for
the signature generation. In order to sign a messageM , the signer first computes the
n-bit digest d = g(M). Then he generates the one-time signature σOTS of the digest
using the sth one-time signature key Xs, s ∈ {0, . . . , 2
H − 1}. The Merkle signature
will contain this one-time signature and the corresponding one-time verification key
Ys. To prove the authenticity of Ys to the verifier, the signer also includes the index
s and the authentication path for the verification key Ys in the signature. The
authentication path is a sequence As = (a0, . . . , aH−1) of nodes of the Merkle tree.
1This is an important difference to signature schemes such as RSA and ECDSA, where potentially
arbitrarily many documents can be signed/verified with one key pair. However, in practice this
number is also limited by the devices on which the signature is generated or by policies.
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a0 g(Y3)
a1
a2
X3
Y3 d
OTS σOTS
Figure 2.2: Merkle signature generation for s = 3. Dashed nodes denote the authen-
tication path for leaf g(Y3). Arrows indicate the path from leaf g(Y3) to
the root.
Node ah in the authentication path is the sibling of the height h node on the path
from leaf g(Ys) to the Merkle tree root:
ah =
{
νh[s/2
h − 1] , if ⌊s/2h⌋ ≡ 1 mod 2
νh[s/2
h + 1] , if ⌊s/2h⌋ ≡ 0 mod 2
(2.17)
for h = 0, . . .H − 1. The details of authentication path computation are discussed
in Chapter 3. In total, the sth Merkle signature is
σs =
(
s, σOTS, Ys, As
)
. (2.18)
Figure 2.2 shows an example for s = 3.
MSS signature verification. Verification of a Merkle signature as in (2.18) consists
of two steps. In the first step, the verifier uses the one-time verification key Ys
to verify the one-time signature σOTS of the digest d by means of the verification
algorithm of the respective one-time signature scheme. In the second step the verifier
validates the authenticity of the one-time verification key Ys by constructing the path
(p0, . . . , pH) from the sth leaf g(Ys) to the root of the Merkle tree. He uses the index
s and the authentication path (a0, . . . , aH−1) and applies the following algorithm.
ph =
{
g(ah−1||ph−1) , if ⌊s/2
h−1⌋ ≡ 1 mod 2
g(ph−1||ah−1) , if ⌊s/2
h−1⌋ ≡ 0 mod 2
(2.19)
for h = 1, . . .H and p0 = g(Ys). The index s is used for deciding in which order the
authentication nodes and the nodes on the path from leaf g(Ys) to the Merkle tree
root are to be concatenated. The authentication of the one-time verification key Ys
is successful if and only if pH equals the public key.
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Performance. Table 2.1 states timings and sizes of a Java implementation of MSS.
More details of the implementation can be found in Chapter 5. We use the W-OTS
as one-time signature scheme and SHA1 as hash function. The first column denotes
the height of the Merkle tree H and the Winternitz parameter w. Recall that 2H
signatures can be generated with one key pair. The remaining columns describe
the signature size as well as timings for key pair generation, signature generation
(average and worst case), and signature verification.
Table 2.1: Timings for MSS using SHA1
(H,w) msignature ckeygen csign a.c. csign w.c. cverify
(10, 4) 1,064 bytes 0.8 sec 3.3 ms 3,9 ms 0.4 ms
(15, 4) 1,164 bytes 23.6 sec 4.9 ms 5,4 ms 0.4 ms
(20, 4) 1,264 bytes 12.6 min 7.0 ms 7,7 ms 0.4 ms
(25, 4) 1,364 bytes 6.7 h 7.7 ms 9,3 ms 0.4 ms
2.3 Efficient root computation
The last section showed that the whole Merkle tree must be computed in order to
obtain its root. The number of operations required is exponential in the tree height
H. However, it is possible to compute the root of a Merkle tree using space only lin-
ear in H. This can be done using the treehash algorithm described in Algorithm 2.1.
The basic idea of this algorithm is to successively compute leaves and, whenever
possible, compute their ancestors. In order to store nodes, the treehash algorithm
uses a stack called Stack equipped with the usual push and pop operations. As
input, the treehash algorithm takes the height H of the Merkle tree. Output is the
root of the Merkle tree. Algorithm 2.1 uses the subroutine Leafcalc(j) to com-
pute the jth leaf. The Leafcalc(j) routine first computes the jth one-time key
pair (Xj , Yj) and then the jth leaf as g(Yj).
Algorithm 2.1 Treehash
Input: Height H ≥ 2
Output: Root of the Merkle tree
1. for j = 0, . . . , 2H − 1 do
a) Compute the jth leaf: Node1 ← Leafcalc(j)
b) While Node1 has the same height as the top node on Stack do
i. Pop the top node from the stack: Node2 ← Stack.pop()
ii. Compute their parent node: Node1 ← g(Node2 ‖ Node1)
c) Push the parent node on the stack: Stack.push(Node1)
2. Let R be the single node stored on the stack: R← Stack.pop()
3. Return R
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1 2 4 5 8 9 11 12
3 6 10 13
7 14
15
Figure 2.3: The treehash algorithm
Figure 2.3 shows the order in which the nodes of a Merkle tree are computed by
the treehash algorithm. In this example, the maximum number of nodes that are
stored on the stack is 3. This happens after node 11 is generated and pushed on
the stack. In general, the treehash algorithm needs to store at most H so-called
tail nodes on the stack. Computing the root of a Merkle tree of height H using
the treehash algorithm requires 2H calls of the Leafcalc subroutine and 2H − 1
evaluations of the hash function.
2.4 Generating one-time signature keys
According to the description of MSS in Section 2.2, the MSS private key consists
of 2H one-time signature keys. Storing such a huge amount of data is not feasible
for most practical applications. As suggested in [10], space can be saved by using a
deterministic pseudo random number generator (PRNG) and storing only the seed
of that PRNG. The length of this seed is usually the same as the output length of
the hash function. Then each one-time signature key must be generated twice, once
for the MSS public key generation and once during the signing phase.
In the following, let PRNG be a cryptographically secure pseudo random number
generator that on input of a n-bit seed Seedin outputs a random number Rand
and an updated seed Seedout, both of bit length n.
PRNG : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n
Seedin 7→ (Rand,Seedout)
(2.20)
In addition to reducing the private key size, using a PRNG for the one-time
signature key generation has another benefit. It makes MSS forward secure as long
as PRNG is forward secure which means that calculating previous seeds from the
current seed is infeasible. Forward security of the signature scheme means that all
signatures issued before a revocation remain valid. MSS using a PRNG is forward
secure, since the current seed can only be used to generate one-time signature keys
for upcoming signatures. When using a PRNG for the one-time key pair generation,
MSS key pair generation and MSS signature generation must be adjusted.
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MSS + PRNG key pair generation. We explain how MSS key-pair generation
using a PRNG works. The first step is to choose a n-bit seed Seed0 randomly with
the uniform distribution. For the generation of the one-time signature keys we use
a sequence of seeds SeedOtsj , 0 ≤ j < 2
H . They are computed iteratively using
Seedj .
(SeedOtsj ,Seedj+1)← PRNG(Seedj), 0 ≤ j < 2
H (2.21)
SeedOtsj is used to calculate the jth one-time signature key. For example, in the
case of W-OTS (see Section 2.1.2) the jth signature key is Xj = (xt−1, . . . , x0). The
t bit strings of length n in this signature key are generated using SeedOtsj .
(xi,SeedOtsj)← PRNG(SeedOtsj), i = t− 1, . . . , 0 (2.22)
When computing xi, the seed SeedOtsj is updated. This shows that in order to cal-
culate the signature key Xj only knowledge of Seedj is necessary. When SeedOtsj
is computed, the new seed Seedj+1 for the generation of the next signature key
Xj+1 is also determined. Figure 2.4 visualizes the one-time signature key generation
using a PRNG. If this method is used, the MSS private key is initially Seed0. Its
length is n. It is replaced by the seeds Seedj+1 determined during the generation
of signature key Xj , 0 ≤ j < 2
H − 1.
PRNG
PRNG
PRNG
PRNG
PRNG
PRNG
PRNGPRNGPRNG
x0
xt−1
x0
xt−1
x0
xt−1
Seed0
Seed1 Seed2H−1
SeedOts0 SeedOts1
SeedOts2H−1
SeedOts0 SeedOts1
SeedOts2H−1
SeedOts0 SeedOts1
SeedOts2H−1
...
...
...
· · ·
Figure 2.4: One-time signature key generation using a PRNG
MSS + PRNG signature generation. In contrast to the original MSS signature
generation, the one-time signature key must be computed before the signature is
generated. When the signature key is computed the seed is updated for the next
signature.
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2.5 Tree chaining
In Section 2.2 we saw that MSS public key generation requires the computation of
the full Merkle hash tree. This means that 2H leaves and 2H−1 inner nodes have to
be determined. This is very time consuming when H is large (see Table 2.1). The
tree chaining method [11] explained in the following solves this problem.
The tree chaining method uses T ≥ 2 layers of Merkle trees. Each Merkle tree
on each layer is constructed using the methods described in Sections 2.2, 2.3, and
2.4. The hashes of a sequence of one-time verification keys are the leafs. We call the
corresponding one-time signature keys the signature keys of the Merkle tree. Those
signature keys are calculated using a pseudo random number generator. We call the
respective seed the seed of the Merkle tree.
The root of the single tree on the top layer 1 is the public key. The signature
keys of the Merkle trees on the bottom layer T are used to sign documents. The
signature keys of the Merkle trees on the intermediate layers i, 1 ≤ i < T sign the
roots of the Merkle trees on layer i+ 1.
This is what a tree chaining signature looks like:
σ =
(
s, SigT , YT ,AuthT
SigT−1, YT−1,AuthT−1
...
Sig1, Y1,Auth1
)
.
(2.23)
SigT is the one-time signature of the document to be signed. It is generated using a
signature key of a Merkle tree on the bottom layer T . The corresponding verification
key is YT . Also, AuthT is the authentication path that allows a verifier to construct
the path from the verification key YT to the root of the corresponding Merkle tree
on the bottom layer. That root is not known to the verifier. Therefore, the one-time
signature SigT−1 of that root is also included in the signature σ. It is constructed
using a signature key of a Merkle tree on level T −1. The corresponding verification
key YT−1 and authentication path AuthT−1 are also included in the signature σ.
The root of the tree on layer T − 1 is also not known to the verifier, unless T = 2
in which case T − 1 = 1 and that root is the public key. So additional one-time
signatures of roots Sigi, one-time verification keys Yi, and authentication paths
Authi are included in the signature σ for i = T − 1, . . . , 1.
The signature σ is verified as follows. The verifier checks if SigT can be verified
using YT . Next, he uses YT and AuthT to construct the root of a Merkle tree on
layer T . He verifies the signature SigT−1 of that root using the verification key YT−1
and constructs the root of the corresponding Merkle tree on layer T − 1 from YT−1
and AuthT−1. The verifier iterates this procedure until the root of the single tree
on layer 1 is constructed. The signature is verified by comparing this root to the
public key. If any of those comparisons fail, the signature σ is rejected. Otherwise,
it is accepted.
We now discuss the advantage of the tree chaining method. For this purpose, we
first compute the number of signatures that can be verified using one public key
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when the tree chaining method is applied. All Merkle trees on layer i have the
same height Hi, 1 ≤ i ≤ T . As mentioned already, there is a single Merkle tree on
the top layer 1. Since the Merkle trees on layer i are used to sign the roots of the
Merkle trees on layer i+ 1, 1 ≤ i < T , the number of Merkle trees on layer i+ 1 is
2H1+H2+...+Hi . So the total number of documents that can be signed/verified is 2H
where H = H1 +H2 + . . .+HT .
The advantage of the tree chaining construction is the following. The generation
of a public MSS key that can verify 2H documents requires the construction of
a tree of height H, which in turn requires the computation of 2H one-time key
pairs and 2H+1 − 1 evaluations of the hash function. When tree chaining is used,
the construction of a public key that can verify 2H documents only requires the
construction of the single Merkle tree on the top layer which is of height H1. Also,
in the tree chaining method, signature generation requires knowledge of the one-time
signature of the root of one Merkle tree on each layer. Those roots and one-time
signatures can be successively computed as they are used, whereas the root of the
first tree on each layer is generated during the key generation. Hence, the key
pair generation requires the computation of 2H1 + . . . + 2HT one-time key pairs
and 2H1+1 + . . . + 2HT+1 − T evaluations of the hash function. This is a drastic
improvement compared to the original MSS key pair generation as illustrated in the
following example.
Example 2.5. Assume that the heights of all Merkle trees are equal, so H1 = . . . =
HT = H. The number of signatures that can be generated with this key pair is 2
TH .
When using the tree chaining method, key pair generation requires T2H one-time
key pairs and T2H+1 − T evaluations of the hash function. The original MSS key
pair generation requires 2TH one-time key pairs and 2TH+1 − 1 evaluations of the
hash function.
The combination of the original MSS and the tree chaining method is called
CMSS. We now describe the key pair generation, signature generation, and signature
verification of CMSS and show some timings.
CMSS key pair generation. For the CMSS key pair generation, the number of
layers T and the respective heights Hi, 1 ≤ i ≤ T of the trees on layer i are selected.
WithH = H1+H2+. . .+HT the number of signatures that can be generated/verified
using the key pair to be constructed is 2H . For each layer, one initial Merkle tree
Treei is constructed as described in Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. The CMSS public
key is the root of Tree1. The CMSS secret key is the sequence of the random seeds
used to construct the T trees. The signer also stores the one-time signatures of the
roots of all those trees generated with the first signature key of the tree on the next
layer.
CMSS key pair generation requires the computation of 2H1 + . . .+ 2HT one-time
key pairs and 2H1+1 + . . .+ 2HT+1 − T evaluations of the hash function.
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sT
s2
s1
RootT
Root2
Root1
TreeT
Tree2
Tree1
Sig2
Sig1
Figure 2.5: The tree chaining method. Treei denotes the active tree on layer i,
Rooti its root, and Sigi−1 this root’s one-time signature generated with
the si−1th signature key of the tree on layer i− 1.
CMSS signature generation. We use the notation of the previous sections. When
a signature is issued, the signer knows one active Merkle tree Treei for each layer
and the seed Seedi from which its signature keys can be generated, i = 1, 2, . . . , T .
The signer also knows the signature Sigi of the root of Treei+1, and the verification
key Yi for that signature, 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1. Further, the signer knows the index si,
1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1, of the signature key used to generate the signature Sigi of the root
of the tree Treei+1 and the index sT of the signature key used to issue the next
document signature. The signer constructs the corresponding signature key from
the seed SeedT , he generates the one-time signature SigT of the document to be
signed and he generates the signature as in Equation (2.23). The index s in this
signature can be recursively computed. Set t1 = s1 and
ti+1 = ti2
Hi+1 + si+1, 1 ≤ i < T,
then s = tT . Figure 2.5 shows an example.
After signing, the signer prepares for the next signature by partially constructing
the next tree on certain layers using the treehash algorithm of Section 2.3. He
first computes the sT th leaf of the next tree on layer T and executes the treehash
algorithm with this leaf as input. Then he increments sT . If sT = 2
HT , then
the construction of the next Merkle tree on layer T is completed and its root is
available. The signer computes the one-time signature of this root using a signature
key of the tree on layer T − 1 and sets the index sT to zero. In the same way, the
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signer constructs the next tree on layer T − 1 and increments the index sT−1. More
generally, the signer partially constructs the next tree on layer i, increments si, and
generates the one-time signature Sigi whenever the construction of the next tree on
layer i+1 is complete, 1 < i < T . On layer 1, no new tree is required and the signer
only increments the index s1 if the construction of a tree on layer 2 is completed.
When s1 = 2
H1 , CMSS cannot sign new documents anymore.
Since a CMSS signature consists of T MSS signatures, the signature size increases
by a factor T compared to MSS. Also, the computation of the roots of the following
trees and their signatures increases the signature generation time.
CMSS signature verification. The basics of the CMSS signature verification are
straight forward and have already been explained above.
We now explain how the verifier uses s to determine a positive integer si for each
layer i, such that Yi is the sith verification key of the active tree on that layer. The
verifier uses si to construct the path from Yi to the root of the corresponding tree on
layer i (see Section 2.2). The following formulae show how this can be accomplished.
jT = ⌊s/2
HT ⌋, ji = ⌊ji+1/2
Hi⌋, i = T − 1, . . . , 1
sT = s mod 2
HT , si = ji+1 mod 2
Hi , i = T − 1, . . . , 1
(2.24)
Performance. Table 2.2 states timings and sizes of a Java implementation of CMSS.
More details of the implementation can be found in Chapter 5. We use two layers
of trees (T = 2), the W-OTS as one-time signature scheme, and SHA1 as hash
function. The first column denotes the height of the Merkle tree and the Winternitz
parameter used on layer one (H1, w1) and layer two (H2, w2). In this case 2
H1+H2
signatures can be generated with one key pair. The remaining columns describe
the signature size as well as timings for key pair generation, signature generation
(average and worst case), and signature verification.
Table 2.2: Timings for CMSS using SHA1
((H1, H2), (w1, w2)) msignature ckeygen csign a.c. csign w.c. cverify
((10, 10), (4, 4)) 2,128 bytes 1.5 sec 4.7 ms 8.5 ms 0.7 ms
((15, 15), (4, 4)) 2,328 bytes 46.7 sec 6.5 ms 11.6 ms 0.8 ms
((20, 20), (4, 4)) 2,528 bytes 24.9 min 8.2 ms 16.2 ms 0.8 ms
This table clarifies the impact of the tree chaining method. For the same number
of possible signatures, the key generation time is reduced drastically compared to
MSS (see Table 2.1). As a result, it is now possible to efficiently generate key pairs
that are able to sign more than 220 documents.
When using CMSS with two layers, the signature size roughly doubles compared
to MSS. This is because there are two one-time signatures included in the CMSS
signature. Using CMSS results in unbalanced signature generation times; there is a
large gap between the average case and worst case signature generation times.
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In this chapter we describe an algorithm for the successive computation of authen-
tication paths [12]. Authentication path computation is a major component of the
MSS signature generation and accounts for a large part of the signature genera-
tion time. There are two different approaches to compute authentication paths. In
[30] Merkle proposes to compute each authentication node separately. This idea
is adopted by Szydlo in [42] where he implements a better scheduling of the node
calculations and achieves the optimal trade-off, that is O(H) time and O(H) space.
In [43], Szydlo further improves the constants of his algorithm. For each authen-
tication path, the algorithm from [43] computes H nodes of the Merkle tree and
requires storage for 3H − 2 nodes. The second approach is called fractal Merkle
tree traversal [23]. This approach splits the Merkle tree into smaller subtrees and
stores a stacked series of subtrees that contain authentication paths for several suc-
ceeding leaves. Varying the height h of the subtrees allows a trade-off between time
and space needed for the tree traversal. Using the low space solution (h = logH)
requires O(H/ logH) time and O(H2/ logH) space. In [8], the authors improve the
constants of this algorithm and prove the optimality of the fractal time-memory
trade-off. Current algorithms for computing authentication paths have fairly un-
balanced running times. The best case runtime of those algorithms is significantly
shorter than the worst case runtime. So the computation of some authentication
paths is very slow while other authentication paths can be computed very quickly.
The algorithm described in this chapter has a significantly better worst case run-
time than the best algorithm known so far, which is Szydlo’s algorithm from [43]
providing the optimal time-memory trade-off. In fact, the worst case runtime of our
algorithm is very close to its average case runtime which, in turn, equals the average
case runtime of Szydlo’s algorithm. The idea of our algorithm is to balance the num-
ber of leaves computed in each authentication path computation, since leaves are by
far the most expensive nodes in the Merkle tree. All known approaches balance the
number of nodes. This does not balance the running time since computing an inner
node only requires one hash function evaluation, while computing a leaf takes several
hundred hash function evaluations. This is because leaves are essentially one-time
verification keys and thus the cost for computing a leaf is determined by the key
pair generation cost of the respective one-time signature scheme. This problem is
pointed out in [8, 31] but no solution has been provided so far. By balancing the
number of leaves that are computed in each round and computing inner nodes as
required, our algorithm achieves a worst case runtime which is extremely close to
its average case runtime and thus provides balanced timings for the authentication
path computation and MSS signature generation.
18
3 Authentication path computation
3.1 The algorithm
We now describe our authentication path algorithm in detail. As before, we denote
the nodes in the Merkle tree by νh[j], where h = H, . . . , 0 denotes the height of the
node in the tree and j = 0, . . . , 2H−h − 1 its position on that height. Leaves have
height 0 and the root has height H. We also use a cryptographic hash function
g : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
Like Szydlo’s algorithm from [43] we deploy two different strategies to compute
authentication nodes, depending on whether the node is a left child (left authenti-
cation node, left node) or a right one. The difference to Szydlo’s algorithm is, that
we use a different approach for scheduling the computation of right nodes. Also, the
computation of right nodes is split into two cases: right nodes close to the root are
stored during the initialization and the remaining nodes are computed. We use the
parameter K to determine up to which height right nodes are computed.
First, we describe the value τ that plays an essential role in our algorithm. Then
we describe the used data structures and introduce the strategies to compute left
and right authentication nodes. Finally we state a pseudo-code description of the
algorithm.
The value τ . The algorithm determines τ = max{h : 2h|(s+1)} which is the height
of the first ancestor of the sth leaf which is a left child. If leaf s is a left child itself,
then τ = 0. Figure 3.1 shows an example.
s = 3
Right node
Left node
τ = 2
Figure 3.1: The height of the first ancestor of leaf s that is a left child is τ = 2.
The dashed nodes denote the authentication path for leaf s. The arrows
indicate the path from leaf s to the root.
The value τ is used to determine at which heights the authentication path for leaf
s+ 1 requires new nodes. The authentication path for leaf s+ 1 requires new right
authentication nodes at heights h = 0, . . . , τ − 1 and one new left authentication
node at height τ .
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Data structures. Our algorithm uses the following data structures:
• Authh, h = 0, . . . , H − 1. An array of nodes that stores the current authenti-
cation path.
• Stack. A stack of nodes with the usual push and pop operations.
• Retainh, h = H−K, . . . ,H− 2. Stack that stores all right nodes on height h.
• Treehashh, h = 0, . . . , H − K − 1. These are instances of the treehash al-
gorithm (see Algorithm 2.1 in Section 2.3). They are used to compute right
authentication nodes on height h. All these treehash instances share the stack
Stack. Further, each instance has the following entries and methods.
– Treehashh.node. This entry can store one tail node. Once the treehash
algorithm is done, this entry contains the height h authentication node
just computed.
– Treehashh.initialize(ϕ). This method initializes the treehash algorithm
with the index ϕ of the leaf to begin with.
– Treehashh.update(). This method executes Algorithm 2.1 once, mean-
ing that it computes the next leaf and performs the necessary hash func-
tion evaluations to compute this leaf’s ancestors, if tail nodes are stored
on the stack.
– Treehashh.height. This entry stores the height of the lowest tail node
stored by this treehash instance, either on the stack Stack or in the
entry Treehashh.node. If Treehashh does not store any tail nodes,
then Treehashh.height = h holds. If Treehashh is finished or not
initialized, then Treehashh.height =∞ holds.
• Keeph, h = 0, . . . , H − 2. An array of nodes that stores certain nodes for the
efficient computation of left authentication nodes.
Computing left nodes. We review the efficient computation of left authentication
nodes due to [43]. As explained above, we require a left node on height τ for the
next authentication path. Call this node Authτ . If τ = 0, then we set Auth0 to
Leafcalc(s). Let τ > 0. Then leaf s is a right child. The left child of Authτ , is
contained in the current authentication path as Authτ−1. We assume that the right
child of Authτ is stored in Keepτ−1. Then the new node Authτ is computed as
Authτ = g
(
Authτ−1 ‖ Keepτ−1
)
. (3.1)
This requires only one hash evaluation. We also explain how Keep is updated. If
⌊s/2τ+1⌋ = 0 (mod 2), i.e. if the ancestor on height τ+1 is a left child, then Authτ
is a right node and we store it in Keepτ .
Computing right nodes. Unlike left authentication nodes, right authentication
nodes must be computed from scratch, i.e. starting from the leaves. This is because
none of their child nodes were used in previous authentication paths.
We use two different methods for computing right nodes. To distinguish those
cases we select a positive integer K ≥ 2 such that H − K is even. Suppose that
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we wish to compute a right node on height h. If H − K ≤ h ≤ H − 2, then
the right node on height h is calculated by Retainh.pop() which pops the top
element from the stack Retainh. That stack has been filled with the right nodes
νh[3], . . . , νh[2
H−h−1] during the initialization of our algorithm. This is very useful
since the nodes close to the root are the most expensive ones to compute.
For the computation of a right node on height h with h < H − K we use an
instance Treehashh of the treehash algorithm. All treehash instances share one
stack. During initialization, the second right node νh[3] on height h is stored in
Treehashh.node. When a new right authentication node on height h is required,
it is determined by Treehashh.pop() for h = 0, . . . ,min{H −K − 1, τ − 1}, which
yields the node stored in Treehashh.node. Then all treehash instances for heights
h = 0, . . . ,min{H − K − 1, τ − 1} are initialized for the computation of the next
right node. The index of the leaf they have to begin with is s + 1 + 3 · 2h and the
initialization is done using the method Treehashh.initialize(s+1+3 ·2
h). Then the
algorithm updates the treehash instances using the Treehashh.update() method.
One update corresponds to one round of Algorithm 2.1, i.e. computing one leaf and
computing this leaf’s ancestors using tail nodes stored on the stack.
We allow a budget of (H−K)/2 updates in each round. We use the strategy from
[42] to decide which of the H−K treehash instances receives an update. For this, we
need the value Treehashh.height. The treehash instance that receives an update is
the instance where Treehashh.height contains the smallest value. If there is more
than one such instance, we choose the one with the lowest index.
Pseudo-code. Algorithm 3.1 shows the pseudo-code of the initialization of our
algorithm which is performed during MSS key pair generation. As input, it takes
the parameters H ≥ 2 and K ≥ 2, where H − K must be even. It outputs the
algorithm’s initial state. Algorithm 3.2 contains the precise description of the update
and output phase of our algorithm. As input, it takes the index s of the current
leaf, the parametersH,K, and the algorithm stateAuth,Keep,Retain,Treehash
prepared in previous rounds or the initialization. It outputs the authentication path
for the next leaf s+ 1 and the updated algorithm state.
Algorithm 3.1 Initialization
Input: H ≥ 2, K ≥ 2 such that H −K is even.
Output: The initial state of the algorithm.
1. Store the authentication path for the first leaf (s = 0):
Authh ← νh[1], h = 0, . . . , H − 1
2. Store the next right authentication node in the treehash instances:
Treehashh.push(νh[3]), h = 0, . . . , H −K − 1
3. Store the right authentication nodes close to the root:
Retainh.push(νh[2j + 3]), h = H −K, . . . ,H − 2, j = 2
H−h−1 − 2, . . . , 0.
4. Return the initial state:
return Auth,Retain,Treehash.
21
3 Authentication path computation
Algorithm 3.2 Update and output
Input: s ∈ {0, . . . , 2H − 2}, H ≥ 2, K such that H −K is even, and the algorithm
state Auth,Keep,Retain,Treehash.
Output: Authentication path for leaf s+ 1 and the updated algorithm state.
1. Let τ = 0 if leaf s is a left node or let τ be the height of the first ancestor of
leaf s which is a left node:
τ ← max{h : 2h|(s+ 1)}
2. If the parent of leaf s on height τ + 1 is a left node, store the current authen-
tication node on height τ in Keepτ :
if ⌊s/2τ+1⌋ is even and τ < H − 1 then Keepτ ← Authτ
3. If leaf s is a left node, it is required for the authentication path of leaf s+ 1:
if τ = 0 then Auth0 ← Leafcalc(s)
4. Otherwise, if leaf s is a right node, the authentication path for leaf s + 1
changes on heights 0, . . . , τ :
if τ > 0 then
a) The authentication path for leaf s+ 1 requires a new left node on height
τ . It is computed using the current authentication node on height τ − 1
and the node on height τ − 1 previously stored in Keepτ−1. The node
stored in Keepτ−1 can then be removed:
Authτ ← g(Authτ−1||Keepτ−1), remove Keepτ−1
b) The authentication path for leaf s+1 requires new right nodes on heights
h = 0, . . . , τ − 1. For h < H −K these nodes are stored in Treehashh
and for h ≥ H −K in Retainh:
for h = 0 to τ − 1 do
if h < H −K then Authh ← Treehashh.pop()
if h ≥ H −K then Authh ← Retainh.pop()
c) For heights 0, . . . ,min{τ − 1, H −K − 1} the treehash instances must be
initialized anew. The treehash instance on height h is initialized with the
index ϕ = s+ 1 + 3 · 2h of the leaf to begin with if ϕ < 2H :
for h = 0 to min{τ − 1, H −K − 1} do
if s+ 1 + 3 · 2h < 2H then Treehashh.initialize(s+ 1 + 3 · 2
h)
5. Next we spend the budget of (H −K)/2 updates on the treehash instances to
prepare upcoming authentication nodes:
repeat (H −K)/2 times
a) We consider only stacks which are initialized and not finished. Let k
be the index of the treehash instance whose lowest tail node has the
lowest height. In case there is more than one such instance we choose
the instance with the lowest index:
k ← min
{
h : Treehashh.height() = min
j=0,...,H−K−1
{Treehashj .height()}
}
b) The treehash instance with index k receives one update:
Treehashk.update()
6. Output the authentication path for leaf s+1 and the updated algorithm state:
return Auth0, . . . ,AuthH−1,Keep,Retain,Treehash.
22
3 Authentication path computation
3.2 Correctness and analysis
In this section we show the correctness of Algorithm 3.2 and estimate its time and
space requirements. First we show that the budget of (H−K)/2 updates per round
is sufficient for the treehash instances to compute the nodes on time. Then we show
that it is possible for all treehash instances to share a single stack. Next, we consider
the time and space requirements of Algorithm 3.2. In detail we show that
i) On average, our algorithm computes (H−K+1)/2 leaves and (H−K−1)/2+
2K−H hashes per round.
ii) The number of tail nodes stored on the stack is bounded by H −K − 2.
iii) The number of hash function evaluations per round is bounded by 3(H −K −
1)/2.
iv) The number of nodes stored in Keep is bounded by ⌊H/2⌋+ 1.
To estimate the space complexity, we have to add the H nodes stored in Auth, the
H − K nodes stored in Treehash and the 2K − K − 1 nodes stored in Retain.
To estimate the time complexity, we have to add the (H −K)/2 leaf computations
required to determine right nodes and one leaf and one hash to compute left nodes
(Lines 3, 4a in Algorithm 3.2). Summing up the total time and space requirements
results in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let H ≥ 2 and K ≥ 2 such that H − K is even. Algorithm 3.2
stores at most 3H + ⌊H/2⌋ − 3K − 2 + 2K nodes and each node requires n bits
of memory. Algorithm 3.2 requires at most (H − K)/2 + 1 leaf computations and
3(H − K − 1)/2 + 1 hash function evaluations per round to successively compute
authentication paths. On average, Algorithm 3.2 computes (H−K+1)/2 leaves and
(H −K − 1)/2 + 2K−H hashes.
Nodes are computed on time. If Treehashh is initialized in round s, the authen-
tication node on height h computed by this instance is required in round s+ 2h+1.
In these 2h+1 rounds there are (H −K)2h updates available. Treehashh requires
2h updates. During the 2h+1 rounds, 2h+1/2i+1 treehash instances are initialized
on heights i = 0, . . . , h − 1, each requiring 2i updates. In addition, active treehash
instances on heights i = h+1, . . . , H−K−1 might receive updates until their lowest
tail node has height h, thus requiring at most 2h updates.
Summing up the number of updates required by all treehash instances yields
h−1∑
i=0
2h+1
2i+1
· 2i + 2h +
H−K−1∑
i=h+1
2h = (H −K)2h (3.2)
as an upper bound for the number of updates required to finish Treehashh on time.
For h = H −K − 1 this bound is tight.
Sharing a single stack works. To show that it is possible for all treehash instances
to share a single stack, we have to show that if Treehashh receives an update and
has tail nodes stored on the stack, all these tail nodes are on top of the stack.
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When Treehashh receives its first update, the height of the lowest tail node of
Treehashi, i ∈ {h+1, . . . , H−K−1} is at least h. This means that Treehashh is
completed before Treehashi receives another update and thus tail nodes of higher
treehash instances do not interfere with tail nodes of Treehashh.
While Treehashh is active and stores tail nodes on the stack, it is possible that
treehash instances on lower heights i ∈ {0, . . . , h−1} receive updates and store nodes
on the stack. If Treehashi receives an update, the height of the lowest tail node
of Treehashh has height ≥ i. This implies that Treehashi is completed before
Treehashh receives another update and therefore doesn’t store any tail nodes on
the stack.
Average costs. We now estimate the average cost of our algorithm in terms of
leaves (L) and hash function evaluations to compute inner nodes (I). We begin
with the right nodes. On height h = 0 there are 2H−1 right leaves to compute.
On heights h = 1, . . . , H −K − 1, there are 2H−h−1 right nodes to compute. The
computation of each of these nodes requires 2h leaves and 2h − 1 hash function
evaluations. For the left nodes, we must compute one leaf and one inner node every
second step, alternating. This makes a total of 2H−1 leaves and inner nodes. Hence,
the total number of leaves and hash function evaluations that must be computed is(
H−K−1∑
h=0
2H−h−1 · 2h + 2H−1
)
L+
(
H−K−1∑
h=1
2H−h−1 · (2h − 1) + 2H−1
)
I(3.3)
=
(
H −K + 1
2
· 2H
)
L+
(
H −K − 1
2
· 2H + 2K
)
I. (3.4)
To obtain the average cost per round we divide by 2H .
Space required by the stack. We will show that the stack stores at most one
tail node on each height h = 0, . . . , H − K − 3 at a time. Treehashh, h ∈
{0, . . . , H − K − 1} stores up to h tail nodes on different heights to compute the
authentication node on height h. The tail node on height h − 1 is stored by the
treehash instance and the remaining tail nodes on heights 0, . . . , h− 2 are stored on
the stack. When Treehashh receives its first update, the following two conditions
hold: (1) all treehash instances on heights < h are either empty or completed and
store no tail nodes on the stack. (2) All treehash instances on heights > h are either
empty or completed or have tail nodes of height at least h. If a treehash instance
on height i ∈ {h+ 1, . . . , H −K − 1} stores a tail node on the stack, then all tree-
hash instances on heights i + 1, . . . , H − K − 1 have tail nodes of height at least
i, otherwise the treehash instance on height i wouldn’t have received any updates
in the first place. This shows that there is at most one tail node on each height
h = 0, . . . , H − K − 3 which bounds the number of nodes stored on the stack by
H −K − 2. This bound is tight for round s = 2H−K+1 − 2, before the update that
completes the treehash instance on height H −K − 1.
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Number of hashes required per round. Assume that the maximum number of hash
function evaluations is required in the following case: TreehashH−K−1 receives all
u = (H − K)/2 updates and is completed in this round. On input of an index s,
the number of hashes required by the treehash algorithm is equal to the height of
the first ancestor of leaf s which is a left node. On height h, a left node occurs
every 2h leaves, which means that every 2h updates at least h hashes are required
by treehash. During the u available updates, there are ⌈u/2h⌉ updates that require
at least h hashes for h = 1, . . . , ⌈log2 u⌉. The last update requires H−K−1 = 2u−1
hashes to complete the treehash instance on height H −K − 1. So far only ⌈log2 u⌉
of these hashes were counted, so we have to add another 2u − 1 − ⌈log2 u⌉ hashes.
In total, we get the following upper bound for the number of hashes required per
round.
B =
⌈log2 u⌉∑
h=1
⌈ u
2h
⌉
+ 2u− 1− ⌈log2 u⌉ (3.5)
In round s = 2H−K+1 − 2 this bound is tight. This is the last round before the
treehash instance on height H −K − 1 must be completed and as explained above,
all available updates are required in this case. The desired upper bound is estimated
as follows:
B ≤
⌈log2 u⌉∑
h=1
( u
2h
+ 1
)
+ 2u− 1− ⌈log2 u⌉
= u
⌈log2 u⌉∑
h=1
1
2h
+ 2u− 1 = u
(
1−
1
2⌈log2 u⌉
)
+ 2u− 1
≤ u
(
1−
1
2u
)
+ 2u− 1 = 3u−
3
2
=
3
2
(H −K − 1)
The next step is to show that the above mentioned case is indeed the worst case. If
a treehash instance on height < H −K − 1 receives all updates and is completed in
this round, less than B hashes are required. The same holds if the treehash instance
receives all updates but is not completed in this round. The last case to consider is
the one where the u available updates are spent on treehash instances on different
heights. If the active treehash instance has a tail node on height j, it will receive
updates until it has a tail node on height j + 1, which requires 2j updates and 2j
hashes. Additional t ∈ {1, . . . , H −K − j − 2} hashes are required to compute the
parent of this node on height j + t + 1, if the active treehash instance stores tail
nodes on heights j + 1, . . . , j + t on the stack and in the treehash instance itself.
The next treehash instance that receives updates has a tail node of height ≥ j.
Since the stack stores at most one tail node for each height, this instance can receive
additional hashes only if there are enough updates to compute a tail node on height
≥ j + t, the height of the next tail node possibly stored on the stack. But this is
the same scenario that appears in the above mentioned worst case, i.e. if a node on
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height j+1 is computed, the tail nodes on the stack are used to compute its parent
on height j + t+ 1 and the same instance receives the next update.
Space required to compute left nodes. First we show that whenever an authen-
tication node is stored in Keeph, h = 1, . . . , H − 2, the node stored in Keeph−1 is
removed in the same round. This immediately follows from Steps 2 and 4a in Algo-
rithm 3.2. Second we show that if a node gets stored inKeeph, h = 0, . . . , H−3, then
Keeph+1 is empty. To see this we have to consider in which rounds a node is stored
in Keeph+1. This is true for rounds s ∈ Aa = {2
h+1− 1+ a · 2h+3, . . . , 2h+2− 1+ a ·
2h+3}, a ∈ N0. In rounds s
′ = 2h− 1+ b · 2h+2, b ∈ N0, a node gets stored in Keeph.
It is straight forward to compute that s′ ∈ Aa implies that 2a+ 1/4 ≤ b ≤ 2a+ 3/4
which is a contradiction to b ∈ N0.
As a result, at most ⌊H/2⌋ nodes are stored in Keep at a time and two consecutive
nodes can share one entry. One additional entry is required to temporarily store the
authentication node on height h (Step 2) until node on height h − 1 is removed
(Step 4a).
3.3 Performance
We now compare the performance of Algorithm 3.2 and Szydlo’s algorithm [43].
Table 3.1 compares the number of leaves and inner nodes computed per step in the
worst case and on average. This table also shows the number of tree nodes that must
be stored. We set the value K for our algorithm as small as possible, i.e. K = 2 is
H is even and K = 3 otherwise. We state the comparison only for Merkle trees up
to height H = 20, since for larger heights the MSS key pair generation becomes too
inefficient and such trees cannot be used in practice (see Section 2.5).
Table 3.1: Leaves and inner nodes computed by Algorithm 3.2 and Szydlo’s algo-
rithm on average and in the worst case and the number of tree nodes that
must be stored.
average case worst case
H leaves inner nodes leaves inner nodes space
Algorithm 3.2
10 4.0 3.0 5 8 31
15 6.3 5.3 7 14 49
20 9.0 8.0 10 24 66
Szydlo’s algorithm
10 4.5 3.5 7 3 28
15 7.0 6.0 10 5 43
20 9.5 8.5 12 8 58
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Table 3.1 shows that in the worst case, our algorithm computes less leaves and
more inner nodes than Szydlo’s algorithm. The average performance of our algo-
rithm is better, which is a result of the slightly increased memory requirements.
The practical advantage of our algorithm, that is the impact of computing less
leaves, is clarified by Table 3.2. This table states the actual number of hash function
evaluations and calls to PRNG required per step, again for the the worst case and
average case. We use SHA1 as hash function and the Winternitz one-time signature
scheme with w = 4. Then, according to Equation (2.6) and Section 2.4, each
leaf calculation requires 646 hash function evaluations and 44 calls to PRNG. The
computation of an inner node requires one hash function evaluation. Table 3.2 also
shows timings for both algorithms. To estimate the timings, we measured the time
required for one hash function evaluation and one call to PRNG on the test platform1
and multiplied these times with the total number of hash function evaluations and
calls to PRNG required. On the test platform, one SHA1 evaluation takes 1.1
microseconds and one call to PRNG 1.27 microseconds.
Table 3.2: Number of hash function evaluations and calls to PRNG required by
Algorithm 3.2 and Szydlo’s algorithm on average and in the worst case
when using SHA1 and Winternitz parameter w = 4.
average case worst case
H hashes PRNG time hashes PRNG time
Algorithm 3.2
10 2588.3 176.1 3.1 ms 3238 220 3.8 ms
15 4042.8 275.0 4.8 ms 4536 308 5.4 ms
20 5822.0 396.0 6.9 ms 6484 440 7.7 ms
Szydlo’s algorithm
10 2911.1 198.0 3.5 ms 4525 308 5.4 ms
15 4528.0 308.0 5.4 ms 6465 440 7.7 ms
20 6145.5 418.0 7.3 ms 7760 528 9.2 ms
In the worst case, our algorithm is significantly faster than Szydlo’s algorithm.
When using SHA1 as hash function and the Winternitz parameter w = 4, our
algorithm is 28.5%, 29.8%, 16.5% faster than Szydlo’s algorithm for H = 10, 15, 20,
respectively. On average, our algorithm is 3.1%, 4.8%, 6.9% faster than Szydlo’s
algorithm for H = 10, 15, 20, respectively. As mentioned above, this is a result of the
slightly increased memory requirement. More importantly, comparing the average
case and worst case runtime of our algorithm shows, that the worst case runtime
of our algorithm is extremely close to its average case runtime. This certifies that
our algorithm provides balanced timings for the authentication path generation and
thus the MSS signature generation.
1AMD Athlon 64 X2 5200+ EE, 2.6 GHz, 2GB memory, MS Windows XP, Java 1.6.0 02.
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We would like to point out that in order to achieve the space bounds for Szydlo’s
algorithm stated in Table 3.1, additional implementing effort and possibly overhead
must be taken into account on platforms without dynamic memory allocation. This
is because Szydlo’s algorithm uses separate stacks for each of the H treehash in-
stances. Roughly speaking, each stack can store up to O(H) nodes but all stacks
together never store more than O(H) nodes at a time. Simply reserving the memory
required by each stack yields memory usage quadratic in H.
Furthermore, comparing the timings of our algorithm with the signature gen-
eration times of MSS stated in Table 2.1 makes it clear that the majority of the
signature generation time is spend on authentication path computation. Improv-
ing the authentication path computation is thus essential for improving the MSS
signature generation times.
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This chapter describes the idea of distributed signature generation [11]. This method
counteracts the problems that arise when using the tree chaining method described
in Section 2.5, namely the unbalanced signature generation times and the increased
signature size. It is based on the observation that the one-time signatures of the roots
and the authentication paths in upper layers change only infrequently. The idea is
to distribute the operations required for the generation of these one-time signatures
and authentication paths evenly across each step. This significantly improves the
worst case signature generation time. The signature scheme that uses distributed
signature generation is called generalized Merkle signature scheme (GMSS). The
worst case signature generation time of GMSS corresponds to the average case sig-
nature generation time of the tree chaining method (CMSS). Also, the worst case
signature generation time of GMSS is extremely close to its average case signature
generation time and thus GMSS provides balanced signature generation times. The
improved signature generation time enables us to reduce the signature size using
the Winternitz time-memory trade-off explained in Section 2.1 without sacrificing
efficiency.
4.1 The idea
Fix a layer 2 ≤ i ≤ T . Denote the active tree on layer i by Treei. It is currently
used to sign roots or documents. The preceding tree on that layer is denoted by
TreePrevi. The next tree on layer i is TreeNexti. The idea of the distributed
signature generation is the following. When Treei is used, the root of TreeNexti
is known. The root of TreeNexti is signed while the signature keys of Treei are
used. The root of TreeNexti was calculated while TreePrevi was used to sign
documents or roots. In the following, chash denotes the cost for one hash function
evaluation and cprng denotes the cost of one call to PRNG.
Distributed root signing. We use the notation from above. We explain how the
root of TreeNexti is signed while using Treei. By construction, the necessary
signature key from layer i− 1 is known.
We distribute the computation of the signature of the root of TreeNexti across
the leaves of Treei. When the first leaf of Treei is used we initialize the Winter-
nitz one-time signature generation by calculating the parameters and executing the
padding. Then we calculate the number of hash function evaluations and calls to
PRNG required to compute the one-time signature key and the one-time signature.
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We divide those numbers by 2Hi where Hi is the height of Treei to estimate the
number of operations required per step. When a leaf of Treei is used, the appropri-
ate amount of computation for the signature of the root of TreeNexti is performed.
The distributed generation of the one-time signatures is visualized in Figure 4.1.
RootNexti
TreeNexti
Treei
Treei−1
SigNexti−1
Figure 4.1: Distributed generation of SigNexti−1, the one-time signature of the
root of TreeNexti.
We estimate the running time of the distributed root signing. The one-time sig-
nature of a root of a tree on layer i is generated using the Winternitz parameter
wi−1 of layer i−1. According to Section 2.1 the generation of this signature requires
(2wi−1 − 1)twi−1 hash function evaluations in the worst case. As shown in Section
2.4 the generation of the one-time signature key requires twi−1 + 1 calls to PRNG.
Since each tree on layer i has 2Hi leaves, the computation of its root signature is
distributed across 2Hi steps. Therefore, the total number of extra operations for
each leaf of Treei to compute the root signature of TreeNexti is at most
csig(i) =
⌈
(2wi−1 − 1)twi−1
2Hi
⌉
chash +
⌈
twi−1 + 1
2Hi
⌉
cprng. (4.1)
Distributed root computation. We explain, how the root of TreeNexti is com-
puted whileTreePrevi is active. BothTreePrevi andTreeNexti have the same
number of leaves. When a leaf of TreePrevi is used, the leaf with the same index
in TreeNexti is calculated and passed to the treehash algorithm from Section 2.3.
If i < T , i.e. TreeNexti is not on the lowest level, the computation of each
leaf of TreeNexti can also be distributed. This is explained next. Suppose
that we want to construct the jth leaf of TreeNexti while we are using the jth
leaf of TreePrevi. This computation is distributed across the leaves of the tree
TreeLower on layer i+ 1 whose root is signed using the jth leaf of TreePrevi.
When the first leaf of TreeLower is used, we determine the number of hash func-
tion evaluations and calls to PRNG required to compute the jth leaf of TreeNexti.
Recall that the calculation of this leaf requires the computation of a Winternitz one-
time key pair. We divide those numbers by 2Hi+1 to obtain the number of operations
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we have to execute for each leaf of TreeLower. Whenever a leaf of TreeLower is
used, the computation of the jth leaf of TreeNext is advanced by executing those
operations.
Once the jth leaf of TreeNexti is generated, it is passed to the treehash al-
gorithm. This contributes to the construction of the root of TreeNexti. This
construction is complete, once we switch from TreePrevi to Treei. So in fact,
when Treei is used, the root of TreeNexti is known. The distributed computa-
tion of the roots is visualized in Figure 4.2. While constructing TreeNexti, we also
perform the initialization steps of the authentication path algorithm of Chapter 3.
That is, we store the authentication path of leaf 0 and the algorithm’s initial state.
TreeNexti
TreeLower
TreePrevi
j
RootNexti
Figure 4.2: Distributed computation of RootNexti. Leaf j of tree TreeNexti is
precomputed while using tree TreeLower. It is then used to partially
compute RootNexti.
We estimate the extra time required by the distributed root computation. Recall
that for the generation of a leaf of TreeNexti we first determine the corresponding
Winternitz one-time key pair. This key pair is constructed using the Winternitz
parameter wi of layer i. The generation of the one-time signature key requires twi+1
calls to PRNG. The generation of the one-time verification key requires (2wi − 1)twi
hash function evaluations and the computation of a leaf of TreeNexti requires one
additional evaluation of the hash function. This has been shown in Sections 2.1 and
2.4. Since TreeLower has 2Hi+1 leaves, the computation of a leaf of TreeNexti
can be distributed over 2Hi+1 steps. Therefore, the total number of extra operations
for each leaf of TreeLower to compute a leaf of TreeNexti is
c
(1)
leaf(i) =
⌈
(2wi − 1)twi + 1
2Hi+1
⌉
chash +
⌈
twi + 1
2Hi+1
⌉
cprng. (4.2)
Once a leaf of TreeNexti is found, it is passed to the treehash algorithm. By the
results of Section 2.3 this costs at most
c
(2)
leaf(i) = Hi · chash (4.3)
additional evaluations of the hash function.
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Distributed authentication path computation. Next, we describe the computation
of the authentication path of the next leaf of tree Treei. We use the algorithm
described in Chapter 3. This algorithm requires the computation of at most (Hi −
Ki)/2 + 1 leaves per round to generate upcoming authentication paths on layer
i = 1, . . . , T . As described above, the computation of these leaves is distributed over
the 2Hi+1 leaves (or steps) of tree TreeLower, the current tree on the next lower
layer i + 1. Again, this is possible only for leaves on layers i = 1, . . . , T − 1. The
computation of the leaves on layer T cannot be distributed.
When we use TreeLower for the first time we calculate the number of hash
function evaluations and calls to PRNG required to compute the (Hi − Ki)/2 + 1
leaves. Recall that we have to compute a Winternitz one-time key pair to obtain
this leaf. Then we divide these costs by 2Hi+1 to estimate the number of operations
we have to spend for each leaf of tree TreeLower. At the beginning we don’t
know which leaves must be computed, we only know how may. Therefore, we have
to interact with Algorithm 3.2. We perform the necessary steps to decide which leaf
must be computed first. After computing this leaf we pass it to the authentication
path algorithm which updates the treehash instance and determines which leaf must
be computed next. This procedure is iterated until all required leaves are computed.
The distributed authentication path computation is visualized in Figure 4.3.
Treei
TreeLower
required leaves
Figure 4.3: Distributed computation of the next authentication path. The (Hi −
Ki)/2 + 1 required leaves are computed while using tree TreeLower.
We estimate the cost of the distributed authentication path computation. The
algorithm of Chapter 3 requires the computation of (Hi −Ki)/2 + 1 leaves for each
authentication path. The leaves are computed using the Winternitz parameter wi of
layer i. The generation of one leaf requires twi +1 calls to PRNG and (2
wi−1)twi +1
hash function evaluations, see Sections 2.1 and 2.4. The computation of the those
(Hi −Ki)/2 + 1 leaves is distributed over the 2
Hi+1 steps in the tree on layer i+ 1.
Therefore, the total number of operations for each leaf of TreeLower to compute
32
4 Distributed signature generation
the (Hi −Ki)/2 + 1 leaves is
c
(1)
auth(i) =
Hi −Ki + 2
2
· c
(1)
leaf(i). (4.4)
The completed leaves are passed to the treehash algorithm that computes their
ancestors. The algorithm of Chapter 3 requires at most 3(Hi − Ki − 1)/2 + 1
evaluations of the hash function for the computation of ancestors. Another Hi−Ki
calls to PRNG are required to prepare upcoming seeds (see Section 5.1). These
operations are not distributed but performed at once. Hence, the total number of
operations for each leaf of Treei is at most
c
(2)
auth(i) =
3(Hi −Ki)− 1
2
· chash + (Hi −Ki) · cprng. (4.5)
Example 4.1. This example illustrates how the distributed signature generation
improves the signature generation time. Let H1 = . . . = HT = H. Further, all layers
use the same Winternitz parameter w and the same value for K. Let csig denote the
worst case cost for generating a one-time signature with Winternitz parameter w,
let cauth denote the worst case cost for generating an authentication path in a tree
of height H using K, and let ctree denote the cost for partially computing the next
tree. The worst case signature generation cost of the distributed signature generation
method then is
csig + cauth + ctree +
(T − 1)csig + (T − 1)cauth + (T − 2)ctree
2H
.
When the signature generation is not distributed, as in case of CMSS, the worst case
signature generation cost is
Tcsig + Tcauth + (T − 1)ctree.
4.2 GMSS
The signature scheme that uses the distributed signature generation is called the gen-
eralized Merkle signature scheme (GMSS). In the following, we describe the GMSS
key pair generation, signature generation and signature verification and analyze the
costs.
GMSS key pair generation. We explain GMSS key pair generation, establish the
size of the keys, and the cost for computing them. The following parameters are
selected. The number T of layers, the heights H1, . . . , HT of the Merkle trees on
each layer, the Winternitz parameters w1, . . . , wT for each layer, and the parameters
K1, . . . ,KT for the authentication path algorithm of Chapter 3.
We use the approach introduced in Section 2.4 and use a PRNG for the one-time
signature generation. Therefore we must choose initial seeds Seedi, for each layer
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i = 1, . . . , T . The GMSS public key is the root Root1 of the single tree on layer
i = 1. The GMSS private key consists of the following entries:
Seedi, i = 1, . . . , T , SeedNexti, i = 2, . . . , T
Sigi, i = 1, . . . , T − 1 , RootNexti, i = 2, . . . , T
Authi, i = 1, . . . , T , AuthNexti, i = 2, . . . , T
Statei, i = 1, . . . , T , StateNexti, i = 2, . . . , T
(4.6)
The seeds Seedi are required for the generation of the one-time signature keys used
to sign the data and the roots. The seeds SeedNexti are required for the distributed
generation of subsequent roots. These seeds are available after the generation of the
roots RootNexti. The one-time signatures Sigi of the roots are required for the
GMSS signatures. The signatures Sigi do not have to be computed explicitly. They
are intermediate values during the computation of leaf 0 of tree Treei−1. The roots
RootNexti of the next tree on each layer are required for the distributed generation
of the one-time signatures SigNexti−1. Also, the authentication path for the first
leaf of the first and second tree on each layer is stored. Statei and StateNexti
denote the state of the authentication path algorithm of Chapter 3 required to com-
pute authentication paths in trees Treei and TreeNexti, respectively. This state
contains the seeds and the treehash instance and is initialized during the generation
of the root.
The construction of a tree on layer i requires the computation of 2Hi leaves and
2Hi − 1 evaluations of the hash function to compute inner nodes. Each leaf com-
putation requires (2wi − 1) · twi + 1 hash function evaluations and twi + 1 calls to
PRNG. The total cost for one tree on layer i is given as
ctree(i) =
(
2Hi (twi(2
wi − 1) + 2)− 1
)
chash + 2
Hi (twi + 1) cprng. (4.7)
Since we construct two trees on layers i = 2, . . . , T and one on layer i = 1, the total
cost for the key pair generation is
ckeygen =
T∑
i=1
ctree(i) +
T∑
i=2
ctree(i). (4.8)
The memory requirements of the keys depend on the output size n of the used hash
function. A root is a single hash value and requires n bits. A seed also requires n
bits. A one-time signature Sigi requires twi−1 · n bits. According to Section 5.1, an
authentication path together with the algorithm state requires
mauth(i) =
(
5Hi +
⌊
Hi
2
⌋
− 5Ki − 2 + 2
Ki
)
· n bits. (4.9)
For each layer i = 2, . . . , T , we store two seeds, two authentication paths and algo-
rithm states, one root and the one-time signature of one root. For layer i = 1, we
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store one seed and one authentication path and algorithm state. The total sizes of
the public and the private key are
mpubkey = n bits, (4.10)
mprivkey =
(
T∑
i=1
(mauth(i) + 1) +
T∑
i=2
(mauth(i) + twi−1 + 2)
)
n bits. (4.11)
GMSS signature generation. The GMSS signature generation is split into two
parts, an online part and an oﬄine part. In the online part, the signer constructs
the current signature key from the seed SeedT and generates the one-time signature
SigT of the document to be signed. Then he prepares the signature as in Equation
(4.12). The oﬄine part takes care of the distributed computation of upcoming roots,
one-time signatures of roots and authentication paths as described above.
σs =
(
s, SigT , YT ,AuthT ,
SigT−1, YT−1,AuthT−1
...
Sig1, Y1,Auth1
)
.
(4.12)
The online part requires the generation of a single one-time signature. This signa-
ture is generated using the Winternitz parameter of the lowest layer T . According
to Section 2.1, this requires
conline = (2
wT − 1)twT · chash + (twT + 1)cprng (4.13)
operations in the worst case. We now compute the size of a GMSS signature. It
consists of T authentication paths (Hi ·n bits) and T one-time signatures (twi ·n bits),
one for each layer i = 1, . . . , T . Adding up results in
msignature =
T∑
i=1
(Hi + twi) · n bits. (4.14)
To estimate the computational effort required for the oﬄine part we assume the
worst case where we have to advance one leaf on all layers i = 1, . . . , T . The
computation of the one-time signature SigNexti can be distributed for all layers
i = 1, . . . , T − 1. The computation of the leaves required to construct the root
RootNexti can be distributed for all layers i = 2, . . . , T − 1. For layer i = T , the
respective leaf of tree TreeNextT must be computed at once. Together with the
hash function evaluations for the treehash algorithm, this requires at most
c
(3)
leaf = ((2
wT − 1)twT +HT + 1)chash + (twT + 1)cprng (4.15)
operations. The leaves required for the computation of upcoming authentication
paths can be distributed for all layers i = 1, . . . , T − 1. For layer i = T , the
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(HT −KT )/2+1 leaves must be computed at once. Together with the hash function
evaluations for the treehash algorithm, this requires at most
c
(3)
auth =
HT −KT + 2
2
· c
(3)
leaf +
3(HT −KT )− 1
2
· chash
+ (HT −KT ) · cprng
(4.16)
operations. In summary, the number of operations required by the oﬄine part in
the worst case are
coﬄine =
T∑
i=2
csig(i) +
T−1∑
i=2
(
c
(1)
leaf(i) + c
(2)
leaf(i)
)
+ c
(3)
leaf
+
T−1∑
i=1
(
c
(1)
auth(i) + c
(2)
auth(i)
)
+ c
(3)
auth.
(4.17)
The last step is to estimate the space required by the oﬄine part. We have to store
the partially constructed one-time signature SigNexti for layers i = 1, . . . , T − 1
which requires at most twi−1 ·n bits. We also have to store the treehash stack for the
generation of the root RootNexti for layers i = 2, . . . , T which requires Hi ·n bits.
We further require memory to store partially constructed leaves. One leaf requires
at most twi ·n bits. For the generation of RootNexti we have to store at most one
leaf for each layer i = 2, . . . , T − 1. For the authentication path, we have to store at
most one leaf for each layer i = 1, . . . , T − 1. Note that since we compute the leaves
required for the authentication path successively, we have to store only one partially
constructed leaf at a time. Finally, we need to store the partial state StateNexti
of the authentication path algorithm for layers i = 2, . . . , T which requires at most
mauth(i) bits (see Equation (4.9)). In summary, the memory required by the oﬄine
part in the worst case is
moﬄine =
(
T∑
i=2
(
twi−1 +Hi +mauth(i)
)
+
T−1∑
i=2
twi +
T−1∑
i=1
twi
)
· n bits. (4.18)
GMSS signature verification. Since the main idea of GMSS is to distribute the
signature generation, the signature verification doesn’t change compared to CMSS.
The verifier successively verifies a one-time signature and uses the corresponding
authentication path and Equation (2.24) to compute the root. This is done until
the root of the tree on the top layer is computed. If this root matches the signers
public key, the signature is valid.
The verifier must verify T one-time signatures which in the worst case requires
(2wi−1)twi evaluations of the hash function, for i = 1, . . . , T . AnotherHi evaluations
of the hash function are required to reconstruct the path to the root using the
authentication path. In total, the number of hash function evaluations required in
the worst case is
cverify =
T∑
i=1
((2wi − 1)twi +Hi) chash. (4.19)
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Performance. Table 4.1 shows timings and sizes of a Java implementation of
GMSS. More details of the implementation can be found in Chapter 5. We use
two layers of trees (T = 2), the W-OTS as one-time signature scheme, and SHA1
as hash function. The first column denotes the height of the Merkle tree and the
Winternitz parameter used on layer one (H1, w1) and layer two (H2, w2). In this
case 2H1+H2 signatures can be generated with one key pair. The remaining columns
describe the signature size as well as the key pair generation, signature generation
(average and worst case), and signature verification times. This table also shows the
timings and sizes of CMSS according to Table 2.2.
Table 4.1: Timings for GMSS and CMSS using SHA1
((H1, H2), (w1, w2)) msignature ckeygen csign a.c. csign w.c. cverify
CMSS
((10, 10), (4, 4)) 2,128 bytes 1.5 sec 4.7 ms 8.5 ms 0.7 ms
((15, 15), (4, 4)) 2,328 bytes 46.7 sec 6.5 ms 11.6 ms 0.8 ms
((20, 20), (4, 4)) 2,528 bytes 24.9 min 8.2 ms 16.2 ms 0.8 ms
GMSS
((10, 10), (4, 4)) 2,128 bytes 2.4 sec 4.0 ms 4.7 ms 0.7 ms
((15, 15), (4, 4)) 2,328 bytes 1.2 min 5.6 ms 6.2 ms 0.8 ms
((20, 20), (4, 4)) 2,528 bytes 37.4 min 7.7 ms 8.6 ms 0.8 ms
GMSS
((10, 10), (8, 4)) 1,708 bytes 7.2 sec 4.0 ms 4.7 ms 3.4 ms
((15, 15), (7, 4)) 1,968 bytes 2.5 min 5.6 ms 6.2 ms 1.7 ms
((20, 20), (6, 4)) 2,248 bytes 57.5 min 7.7 ms 8.6 ms 1.6 ms
GMSS
((10, 10), (9, 5)) 1,508 bytes 13.1 sec 6.3 ms 7.6 ms 6.3 ms
((15, 15), (8, 5)) 1,748 bytes 4.3 min 8.9 ms 10.0 ms 3.7 ms
((20, 20), (7, 5)) 2,008 bytes 95.4 min 12.2 ms 13.8 ms 2.8 ms
This table shows that GMSS works as promised. The first half of Table 4.1 shows,
that the worst case signature generation times are reduced drastically compared to
CMSS. Also, the GMSS worst case signature generation times are extremely close to
its average case signature generation times. Thus, GMSS provides balanced signa-
ture generation times. The reduced signature generation times enable us to choose
larger Winternitz parameters without sacrificing efficiency as shown by the second
half of Table 4.1. This results in smaller signatures. Using such large Winternitz
parameters for CMSS is not advisable. For example, when using (H1, H2) = (20, 20)
and (w1, w2) = (7, 5), CMSS signature generation takes 47.6 ms in the worst case.
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The techniques discussed in the last two chapters aim at improving the practi-
cal performance of the Merkle signature scheme. This chapter presents timings of
two implementations of these techniques to substantiate their practicability. The
first implementation is a JCA conform Java implementation of GMSS. The sec-
ond implementation is designed for 8-bit AVR microcontrollers. It incorporates the
improvements from Section 2.4 and Chapter 3. We will present timings and sizes
using different efficiency parameters to clarify the flexibility of the improvements of
the last Chapters. We will also compare our implementations to the widely used
signature schemes RSA and ECDSA. We begin by explaining some implementation
specific refinements of GMSS.
5.1 Implementation specific refinements of GMSS
The first refinement regards the pseudo random number generator used for the
generation of the one-time signature keys as explained in Section 2.4.
PRNG : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n
Seedin 7→ (Rand,Seedout)
(5.1)
In our implementations, we use the hash based PRNG described in [19]. Let g :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a cryptographic hash function with output length n bits. On
input of a seed Seedin this PRNG computes the pseudo random number Rand and
the updated seed Seedout as follows.
Rand ← g(Seedin),
Seedout ← (1 + Seedin +Rand) mod 2
n
(5.2)
Note that different implementations of GMSS must use the same PRNG in order to
guarantee interoperability of the private keys.
The second refinement reduces the size of the GMSS signatures when using the
Winternitz one-time signature scheme. The one-time verification keys are no longer
included as part of the signature. This is possible because the verifier recomputes
the one-time verification key during the Winternitz one-time signature verification
(see Section 2.1.2). Instead of verifying the one-time signature using the allegedly
authentic one-time verification key included in the signature, the verifier directly
validates the authenticity of the recomputed one-time verification key using the
authentication path. If the so computed root does not match the signers public key,
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then either the one-time signature or the authentication path is invalid. The saving
of this refinement is the size of a Winternitz one-time verification key.
The third refinement improves the runtime of the GMSS signature generation.
Using the authentication path algorithm described in Chapter 3, the computation
of left authentication nodes requires the computation of a leaf whenever the value
s is even (see Line 3 in Algorithm 3.2). The leaf that must be computed is the
sth leaf. In round s, the one-time signature key that corresponds to the sth leaf is
used to generate the one-time signature of the document. Since the authentication
path algorithm is executed after the sth signature has been generated and sent to
the verifier, this one-time signature is available. Instead of computing the sth leaf
from scratch, it is obtained by verifying this one-time signature which yields the
sth one-time verification key Ys and finally the sth leaf g(Ys). The saving of this
refinement is the time required to generate the one-time signature.
The fourth refinement regards the leaves computed by the authentication path
algorithm of Chapter 3 for the generation of right authentication nodes. The one-
time signature keys corresponding to these leaves are generated using a PRNG as
explained in Section 2.4. During the authentication path computation, leaves which
are up to 3 · 2H−K−1 steps away from the current leaf must be computed by the
treehash instances. Calling PRNG that many times to obtain the correct seed is too
inefficient. Instead we use the following scheduling strategy that requires H − K
calls to PRNG in each round to compute the seeds. Let Seeds denote the seed
required to compute the one-time key pair corresponding to the sth leaf. We have
to store two seeds for each height h = 0, . . . , H −K − 1. The first seed is denoted
SeedActiveh and used to successively generate the leaves required for the computa-
tion of the height h authentication node currently constructed by Treehashh. The
second seed is denoted SeedNexth and used for upcoming right nodes on height
h. SeedNext is updated using PRNG in each round. During the initialization,
we set SeedNexth = Seed3·2h for h = 0, . . . , H − K − 1. In each round, at first
all seeds SeedNexth are updated using PRNG. If in round s a new treehash in-
stance is initialized on height h, we copy SeedNexth to SeedActiveh. In that
case SeedNexth = Seeds+1+3·2h holds and thus is the correct seed to begin com-
puting the next authentication node on height h. The time and space requirements
of Algorithm 3.2 change as follows. We have to store additional 2(H−K) seeds and
require additional H −K calls to PRNG in each round.
5.2 Implementation in Java
GMSS, that is the Merkle signature scheme in combination with the improvements
from Section 2.4, Section 2.5, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4, has been implemented as
part of the Java Cryptographic Service Provider FlexiProvider [20]. It is therefore
possible to integrate GMSS into any application that uses the Java Cryptographic
Architecture [40] and Java Cryptography Extension [41]. A detailed description of
the implementation can be found in [37, 7]. The implementation supports GMSS
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using SHA1 and the whole SHA2 family as hash function. The FlexiProvider also
includes an implementation of CMSS which was used for the timings shown in Table
2.2. Further, the FlexiProvider includes implementations of RSA and ECDSA which
we use for the comparison. The test platform was an AMD Athlon 64 X2 5200+ EE
running at 2.6 GHz with 2GB of memory using MS Windows XP and Java 1.6.0 02.
As described in the last chapter, GMSS can be customized using several param-
eters that influence the time required for key pair generation, signature generation,
and verification as well as the space required for the signatures and the private key.
These parameters are summarized in the parameter set
P =
(
T, (H1, . . . , HT ), (w1, . . . , wT ), (K1, . . . ,KT )
)
, (5.3)
where T denotes the number of layers, Hi denotes the height of the Merkle trees on
layer i, wi denotes the Winternitz parameter used on layer i, and Ki denotes the
parameter for the authentication path algorithm of Chapter 3 used on layer i, for
i = 1, . . . , T . The number of signatures that can be generated using parameter set
P is 2H1+···+HT .
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 show timings and sizes of GMSS, RSA, and ECDSA using
SHA1, SHA224, and SHA256 as hash function, respectively. The key sizes for RSA
and ECDSA were chosen such that all three schemes offer a similar security level
[18]. The elliptic curves used for ECDSA are the curves secp160k1, secp224k1, and
secp256k1 recommended by SECG [36]. In case of RSA and ECDSA the first column
indicates the size of the modulus. In case of GMSS, the first column indicates the
used parameter set P . We give timings for six parameter sets, two for up to 220,
230, and 240 possible signatures, respectively. The parameter sets are
220 signatures:
P1 =
(
2, (13, 7), (10, 7), (3, 3)
)
P2 =
(
2, (13, 7), (7, 4), (3, 3)
)
230 signatures:
P3 =
(
2, (15, 15), (10, 7), (3, 3)
)
P4 =
(
2, (15, 15), (7, 4), (3, 3)
)
240 signatures:
P5 =
(
3, (15, 15, 10), (10, 9, 7), (3, 3, 2)
)
P6 =
(
3, (15, 15, 10), (7, 7, 4), (3, 3, 2)
)
For each number of possible signatures, there is one parameter set that optimizes
the memory requirements and one that optimizes the timings. The parameters K
are chosen such that the memory requirements are minimal, i.e. K = 2 if H is
even and K = 3 otherwise. In these tables mprivkey corresponds to the sum of
mprivkey and moﬄine estimated in Equations (4.11) and (4.18) in Chapter 4. Also,
csign corresponds to the sum of conline and coﬄine estimated in Equations (4.13) and
(4.17) in Chapter 4.
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Table 5.1: Timings for GMSS, RSA, and ECDSA using SHA1
Memory in bytes Timings in ms
Scheme mpubkey mprivkey msignature ckeygen csign cverify
GMSS-P1 75 5,967 1,268 2.5 min 12.8 11.5
GMSS-P2 75 6,525 1,768 0.4 min 2.9 2.1
GMSS-P3 75 9,619 1,468 13.6 min 25.0 10.9
GMSS-P4 75 10,178 1,968 2.6 min 5.6 2.3
GMSS-P5 84 15,098 2,072 21.4 min 17.8 17.2
GMSS-P6 84 16,155 2,672 5.3 min 4.0 3.8
RSA-1024 162 635 128 0,4 sec 6.9 0.4
RSA-1248 190 763 156 0.7 sec 12.1 0.5
RSA-1536 226 921 192 1.2 sec 21.3 0.8
ECDSA-160 64 52 46 5.0 ms 4.6 5.6
Table 5.2: Timings for GMSS, RSA, and ECDSA using SHA224
Memory in bytes Timings in ms
Scheme mpubkey mprivkey msignature ckeygen csign cverify
GMSS-P1 83 8,600 2,220 6.2 min 30.6 28.5
GMSS-P2 83 9,607 3,172 1.1 min 6.9 4.8
GMSS-P3 83 13,279 2,500 33.1 min 60.3 28.3
GMSS-P4 83 14,286 3,452 6.1 min 13.6 4.6
GMSS-P5 92 21,458 3,540 51.6 min 42.6 41.5
GMSS-P6 92 23,442 4,688 12.7 min 9.7 9.1
RSA-2048 294 1217 256 3.8 sec 47.4 1.4
RSA-2432 342 1433 304 6.1 sec 77.4 1.9
RSA-4096 550 2376 512 48.0 sec 348.3 5.2
ECDSA-224 80 60 62 9.5 ms 8.8 10.7
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Table 5.3: Timings for GMSS, RSA, and ECDSA using SHA256
Memory in bytes Timings in ms
Scheme mpubkey mprivkey msignature ckeygen csign cverify
GMSS-P1 87 10,021 2,792 7.0 min 35.3 32.0
GMSS-P2 87 11,427 4,040 1.2 min 7.9 5.6
GMSS-P3 87 15,209 3,112 37.7 min 69.4 33.2
GMSS-P4 87 16,616 4,360 7.1 min 15.7 5.6
GMSS-P5 96 25,010 4,428 58.9 min 49.4 46.7
GMSS-P6 96 27,694 5,932 14.7 min 11.2 9.9
RSA-2048 294 1,217 256 3.8 sec 47.4 1.4
RSA-3248 444 1,892 406 19.9 sec 178.2 3.3
RSA-4096 550 2,376 512 48.0 sec 348.3 5.2
ECDSA-256 88 64 70 12.7 ms 11.8 14.2
These tables show that GMSS is as efficient as RSA and ECDSA regarding signa-
ture generation and verification. RSA signature verification is faster only because
small (16-bit) public exponents were used in the experiments. GMSS key pair gen-
eration is considerably slower than RSA and ECDSA key pair generation. However,
we don’t consider this as a setback because key pair generation is not performed
frequently. Also, the comparatively large GMSS private keys can be easily stored
on desktop PCs. The central issue of GMSS is still the size of the signatures. Even
with the Winternitz trade-off that reduces the signature size by a factor w, the sig-
nature size is quadratic in the output length of the hash function. However, in many
use cases this does not introduce a significant overhead. For example, it does not
matter whether a 3,000 byte or a 300 byte signature is attached to a several hundred
kilobyte large software update.
Next, we show timings of GMSS that clarify the trade-off between signature gener-
ation time and private key size possible using the parameter K in the authentication
path algorithm of Chapter 3. Table 5.4 shows timings for the following six param-
eter sets using SHA1, SHA224, and SHA256 as hash function. The only difference
to the previously used parameter sets is the increased value of K.
220 signatures:
P ′1 =
(
2, (13, 7), (10, 7), (5, 5)
)
P ′2 =
(
2, (13, 7), (7, 4), (5, 5)
)
230 signatures:
P ′3 =
(
2, (15, 15), (10, 7), (5, 5)
)
P ′4 =
(
2, (15, 15), (7, 4), (5, 5)
)
240 signatures:
P ′5 =
(
3, (15, 15, 10), (10, 9, 7), (5, 5, 4)
)
P ′6 =
(
3, (15, 15, 10), (7, 7, 4), (5, 5, 4)
)
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Table 5.4: Timings for GMSS using larger values for K
Memory in bytes Timings in ms
Scheme mpubkey mprivkey msignature ckeygen csign cverify
Using SHA1
GMSS-P ′1 75 7,090 1,268 2.5 min 10.1 11.5
GMSS-P ′2 75 7,647 1,768 0.4 min 2.3 2.1
GMSS-P ′3 75 10,202 1,468 13.6 min 22.3 10.9
GMSS-P ′4 75 10,761 1,968 2.6 min 5.1 2.3
GMSS-P ′5 84 15,665 2,072 21.4 min 15.7 17.2
GMSS-P ′6 84 16,724 2,672 5.3 min 3.6 3.8
Using SHA224
GMSS-P ′1 83 10,204 2,220 6.2 min 24.5 28.5
GMSS-P ′2 83 11,210 3,172 1.1 min 5.5 4.8
GMSS-P ′3 83 14,164 2,500 33.1 min 53.8 28.3
GMSS-P ′4 83 15,171 3,452 6.1 min 12.2 4.6
GMSS-P ′5 92 22,372 3,540 51.6 min 37.9 41.5
GMSS-P ′6 92 24,359 4,688 12.7 min 8.7 9.1
Using SHA256
GMSS-P ′1 87 11,862 2,792 7.0 min 28.2 32.0
GMSS-P ′2 87 13,268 4,040 1.2 min 6.3 5.6
GMSS-P ′3 87 16,243 3,112 37.6 min 62.1 33.2
GMSS-P ′4 87 17,650 4,360 7.1 min 14.0 5.6
GMSS-P ′5 96 26,099 4,428 58.9 min 43.7 46.7
GMSS-P ′6 96 28,786 5,932 14.7 min 9.9 9.9
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Code example. The following code example demonstrates how the FlexiProvider
implementation of GMSS can be used. This example uses SHA1 as hash function
and the parameter set P1 =
(
2, (13, 7), (10, 5), (3, 3)
)
.
1. Include the required classes.
import java.security.KeyPair;
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator;
import java.security.PrivateKey;
import java.security.Signature;
import java.security.PublicKey;
import java.security.Security;
import de.flexiprovider.pqc.hbc.gmss.GMSSParameterSpec;
import de.flexiprovider.pqc.FlexiPQCProvider;
public class example {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
Security.addProvider(new FlexiPQCProvider());
2. Generate a KeyPairGenerator and Signature object.
KeyPairGenerator keyPairGenerator = //
KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("GMSSwithSHA1","FlexiPQC");
Signature signature = //
Signature.getInstance("GMSSwithSHA1","FlexiPQC");
3. Generate the parameter set.
int T = 2;
int[] H = {13, 7};
int[] w = {10, 5};
int[] K = {3, 3};
GMSSParameterSpec P = new GMSSParameterSpec(T, H, w, K);
44
5 Implementation and performance
4. Initialize the KeyPairGenerator with the parameter set, generate the key pair,
and extract the private and public key.
keyPairGenerator.initialize(P);
KeyPair gmssKeyPair = keyPairGenerator.genKeyPair();
PublicKey gmssPublicKey = gmssKeyPair.getPublic();
PrivateKey gmssPrivateKey = gmssKeyPair.getPrivate();
5. Choose the message to be signed.
byte[] messageBytes = "Hello world!".getBytes();
6. Initialize the Signature object with the private key for signing. Then sign the
message.
signature.initSign(gmssPrivateKey);
signature.update(messageBytes);
byte[] signatureBytes = signature.sign();
7. Initialize the Signature object with the public key for verification. Then
verify the message.
signature.initVerify(gmssPublicKey);
signature.update(messageBytes);
boolean valid = signature.verify(signatureBytes);
if (valid) System.out.println("Signature valid");
else System.out.println("Signature invalid");
}
}
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5.3 Implementation on a microcontroller
We now turn our attention to an implementation of the Merkle signature scheme
on a microcontroller [34]. We call this implementation MMSS (Micro Merkle sig-
nature scheme). MMSS is designed to run on any 8-bit AVR microcontroller that
offers 4 KBytes SRAM, about 4 KBytes EEPROM and at least 8 KBytes of pro-
gram memory. For the performance measurements we used an Atmel ATmega128
microcontroller [3] that was clocked to 16MHz within the specification limits. Time-
critical routines of the implementation, such as the hash function, were implemented
in assembly and we used C to glue this routings together.
MMSS incorporates the improvements from Section 2.4 and Chapter 3. Multi-
ple layers of trees are not supported by this implementation. This is because the
maximum number of allowed write cycles for the EEPROM of the microcontroller is
close to 216 [2, 3] and it is therefore impossible to generate more than 216 signatures
during the life-span of the microcontroller. So it is sufficient to use a single Merkle
tree of height at most 16 and the time required for the key pair generation is not
an issue; especially because it is done on an desktop PC. MMSS uses AES based
hash functions; a single block length construction with output length 128 bit for the
generation of the one-time signatures and the Merkle tree and a double block length
construction with output length 256 bit for the initial hashing of the document.
Remark 5.1. As we will see in the next chapter, MSS requires a collision resistant
hash function to be provably secure. This means that from a provable security point
of view, using AES as hash function does not provide a sufficiently large security
level. However, the best known attacks on the Merkle scheme require the computation
of preimages and second preimages; being able to find collisions does not help. Hence
using 128-bit hash functions yields a sufficiently large security level in practice.
Single block length construction. The single block length hash in our scheme is
constructed using the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) construction [29]. The MMO
construction is recursively defined as fi+1 = Efi(Mi) ⊕Mi with E being the en-
cryption function, Mi the current message block and f0 an initialization vector (see
Figure 5.1). Since we use AES as encryption function, the MMO construction yields
a hash function with output length 128 bit.
fi fi+1
Mi
E
Figure 5.1: Single block length construction due to [29]. The output of the block
cipher E is xored with the message block Mi. fi, fi+1, and Mi are each
of bit length 128.
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Double block length construction. For applications such as the initial digest gen-
eration in a signature scheme, collision resistance is needed and the security of single
block length (SBL) constructions is not sufficient. For our implementation, we use
the MDC-2 double length construction specified in the ISO/IEC 10118-2 standard.
The standard envisions the usage of DES, but there is a variant using AES-128 [44]
as depicted in Figure 5.2. This construction takes a block cipher with block length
n bit and produces a hash function with 2n bit output length. In [39] the authors
show, that an adversary needs at least 23n/5 oracle queries to find a collision. How-
ever, the best practical attacks require 2n queries. Since we use AES as encryption
function, the MDC-2 construction yields a hash function with output length 256 bit.
The double block length construction is only used for initial digest generation. It
can easily be replaced by a dedicated hash function resulting in a negligible perfor-
mance loss but an increased code size.
g0
i
g1
i
Mi
(A ‖ B)
(C ‖ D)
g0
i+1 = C ‖ B
g1
i+1 = A ‖ D
E
E
Figure 5.2: Double block length construction due to [44]. The outputs of the
block cipher E are xored with the message block Mi and permuted.
g0i , g
1
i , g
0
i+1g
1
i+1, and Mi are each of bit length 128.
Performance. Similar to the Java implementation of GMSS, MMSS can be cus-
tomized using the parameter set
P = (H,w,K). (5.4)
Here, H denotes the height of the Merkle tree, w denotes the Winternitz parameter,
and K denotes the parameter for the authentication path algorithm of Chapter 3.
The number of signatures that can be generated using parameter set P is 2H . We
give timings for six parameter sets, three for up to 210 and 216 possible signatures,
respectively. The parameter sets are
210 signatures:
P1 = (10, 2, 2)
P2 = (10, 2, 4)
P3 = (10, 4, 4)
216 signatures:
P4 = (16, 2, 2)
P5 = (16, 2, 4)
P6 = (16, 4, 4)
Table 5.5 show timings and sizes of our MMSS implementation and reference im-
plementations of RSA and ECDSA. In case of MMSS, the first column indicates
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the used parameter set P . In case of RSA and ECDSA the first column indicates
the size of the modulus. Since the key pair generation is not performed on the
microcontroller but on a desktop PC, we removed the column for the key pair gen-
eration time. We just remark that key pair generation for these parameters takes
only a few minutes. New is the column mROM, which denotes the code size of the
implementation.
Table 5.5: Timings for MMSS, RSA and ECDSA on an Atmel ATmega128 micro-
controller.
Memory in Bytes Time in msec
Scheme mpubkey mprivkey msignature mROM csign cverify
MMSS-P1 16 848 2290 6600 756 82
MMSS-P2 16 876 2290 6600 598 82
MMSS-P3 16 876 1234 6600 946 124
MMSS-P4 16 1440 2350 6600 1230 85
MMSS-P5 16 1472 2350 6600 1072 85
MMSS-P6 16 1472 1330 6600 1665 127
RSA-1024 [22] 131 128 128 7400 5495 215
RSA-2048 [22] 259 256 256 10600 41630 970
ECDSA-160 [15] 40 21 40 43200 423 423
ECDSA-160 [27] 40 21 40 17900 1001 1218
This table shows that MMSS compares excellently to state of the art implementa-
tions of RSA and ECDSA. It provides the fastest signature verification times, even
though the RSA timings were measured using a small public exponent. Signature
generation is faster than RSA and comparable to ECDSA. As in case of GMSS,
the MMSS private key and signature sizes are large compared to RSA and ECDSA.
However, it is no problem to store them in the microcontroller’s memory. Another
benefit of MMSS is the small code size, which is also an issue when implementing
on resource constrained devices.
In summary, the MMSS implementation shows that the improvements of the last
chapters allow the Merkle signature scheme to be integrated in resource constrained
devices while being highly competitive to currently used signature schemes.
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This section deals with the security of the Merkle signature scheme (MSS). One great
advantage of the Merkle signature scheme is that it is provably secure. Based on the
work of Coronado [13, 14], we will show in Section 6.1 that the Lamport–Diffie one-
time signature scheme (LD-OTS) is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen
message attacks as long as the used one-way function is preimage resistant. Then we
show that the Merkle signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive
chosen message attacks as long as the used hash function is collision resistant and
the underlying one-time signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive
chosen message attacks. On the basis of these reductions we estimate the security
level of MSS combined with LD-OTS.
The security level of MSS combined with LD-OTS is essentially determined by the
collision resistance of the hash function. Recent attacks on popular hash functions
like MD5 [45] and SHA1 [46] have shown that collision resistance is a hard to achieve
property. In Section 6.2 we describe a different construction method for Merkle
trees. We call the signature scheme that uses the new construction SPR-MSS. We
will show that SPR-MSS is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message
attacks as long as the used hash function is second-preimage resistant. This is a
drastic improvement compared to the collision resistance requirement of the original
Merkle scheme, since generic attacks to compute second preimages cannot exploit
the birthday paradox. Thus, the new scheme has a significantly higher security
level. After presenting the security reduction for SPR-MSS, we also estimate its
security level. In Section 6.3, we compare the security level of MSS and SPR-MSS
for different output lengths n of the hash function. We begin with some security
notions and definitions.
Security notions for hash functions. We present three security notions for hash
functions: preimage resistance, second preimage resistance, and collision resistance.
The definitions are taken from [35]. We write x
$
←− S for the experiment of choosing
a random element from the finite set S with the uniform distribution. Let G be a
family of hash functions, that is, a parameterized set
G =
{
gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
(6.1)
where n ∈ N and K is a finite set. The elements of K are called keys. An adversary
Adv is a probabilistic algorithm that takes any number of inputs.
We define preimage resistance. In fact, our notion of preimage resistance is a
special case of the preimage resistance defined in [35] which is useful in our context.
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Consider an adversary that attempts to find preimages of the hash functions in G.
The adversary takes as input a key k ∈ K and the image y = gk(x) of a string
x ∈ {0, 1}n. Both k and x are chosen randomly with the uniform distribution. The
adversary outputs a preimage x′ of y or failure. The success probability of this
adversary is denoted by
Pr[k
$
←− K,x
$
←− {0, 1}n, y ←− gk(x), x
′ $←− Adv(k, y) : gk(x
′) = y]. (6.2)
Let t, ǫ be positive real numbers. The family G is called (t, ǫ) preimage resistant, if
the success probability (6.2) of any adversary Adv that runs in a time t is at most
ǫ.
Next, we define second preimage resistance. Consider an adversary that attempts
to find second preimages of the hash functions in G. The adversary takes as input
a key k ∈ K and a string x ∈ {0, 1}2n, both chosen randomly with the uniform
distribution. He outputs a second preimage x′ under gk of gk(x) which is different
from x or failure. The success probability of this adversary is denoted by
Pr[k
$
←− K,x
$
←− {0, 1}2n, x′
$
←− Adv(k, x) : x 6= x′ ∧ gk(x) = gk(x
′)]. (6.3)
Let t, ǫ be positive real numbers. The family G is called (t, ǫ) second-preimage
resistant, if the success probability (6.3) of any adversary Adv that runs in a time
t is at most ǫ.
Finally, we define collision resistance. Consider an adversary that attempts to
find collisions of the hash functions in G. The adversary takes as input a key k ∈ K,
chosen randomly with the uniform distribution. He outputs a collision of gk, that
is a pair x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ with x 6= x′ and g(x) = g(x′) or failure. The success
probability of this adversary is denoted by
Pr[k
$
←− K, (x, x′)
$
←− Adv(k) : x 6= x′ ∧ gk(x) = gk(x
′)]. (6.4)
Let t, ǫ be positive real numbers. The family G is called (t, ǫ) collision resistant, if
the success probability (6.4) of any adversary Adv that runs in a time t is at most
ǫ.
Signature schemes. Let Sign be a signature scheme. So Sign is a triple (Gen,
Sig, Ver). Gen is the key pair generation algorithm. It takes as input 1n, the
string of n successive 1s where n ∈ N is a security parameter. It outputs a pair
(sk, pk) consisting of a private key sk and a public key pk. Sig is the signature
generation algorithm. It takes as input a message M and a private key sk. It
outputs a signature σ for the messageM . Finally, Ver is the verification algorithm.
Its input is a message M , a signature σ and a public key pk. It checks whether σ is
a valid signature for M using the public key pk. It outputs true if the signature is
valid and false otherwise.
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Existential unforgeability. Let Sign = (Gen,Sig,Ver) be a signature scheme
and let (sk, pk) be a key pair generated by Gen. We define existential unforgeability
under adaptive chosen message attacks of Sign. This security model assumes a
very powerful forger. The forger has access to the public key and a signing oracle
O(sk, ·) that, in turn, has access to the private key. On input of a message the oracle
returns the signature of that message. It is the goal of the forger to win the following
game. The forger chooses at most q messages and lets the signing oracle find the
signatures of those messages. The maximum number q of queries is also an input
of the forger. The oracle queries may be adaptive, that is, they may depend on the
oracles answers to previously queried messages. The forger outputs a pair (M ′, σ′).
The forger wins if M ′ is different from all the messages in the oracle queries and if
Ver(M ′, σ′, pk) = true. We denote such a forger by ForO(sk,·)(pk).
Let t and ǫ be positive real numbers and let q be a positive integer. The signa-
ture scheme Sign is (t, ǫ, q) existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message
attacks if for any forger that runs in a time t, the success probability for winning
the above game (which depends on q) is at most ǫ. If Sign has the above property
it is also called a (t, ǫ, q) signature scheme.
For one-time signatures we must have q = 1 since the signature key of a one-time
signature scheme must be used only once. For the Merkle signature scheme we must
have q ≤ 2H .
6.1 Security of the Merkle signature scheme
We begin with a security reduction for the Lamport–Diffie one-time signature scheme
(LD-OTS) followed by a security reduction for the Merkle signature scheme (MSS).
Finally, we estimate the security level of the Merkle signature scheme combined with
the Lamport–Diffie one-time signature scheme.
6.1.1 Security reduction for the Lamport–Diffie OTS
In this section we discuss the security of LD–OTS from Section 2.1. We slightly
modify this scheme. Select a security parameter n ∈ N. Let K = K(n) be a finite
set of parameters. Let
F =
{
fk : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
be a family of one-way functions. The key generation of the modified LD–OTS works
as follows. On input of 1n for a security parameter n a key k ∈ K(n) is selected
randomly with the uniform distribution. Then LD–OTS is used with the one-way
function fk. The secret and public keys are generated as described in Section 2.1.
The key k is included in the public key. We show that the existential unforgeability
under adaptive chosen message attacks of this LD-OTS variant can be reduced to
the preimage resistance of the family F .
Suppose that there exists a forger ForO(X,·)(Y ) of LD-OTS. Then an adversary
AdvPre that determines preimages of functions in F can be constructed as follows.
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Fix a security parameter n. The adversary AdvPre takes as input a key k and the
image y = fk(x) of a string x ∈ {0, 1}
n. Both k and x are selected randomly with
the uniform distribution. A LD–OTS key pair (X,Y ) is generated using the one-way
function fk. The public key Y is of the form Y = (yn−1[0], yn−1[1], . . . , y0[0], y0[1]).
The adversary selects indices a ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} and b ∈ {0, 1} randomly with the
uniform distribution. He replaces the string ya[b] with the target string y. Next,
AdvPre runs the forger For
O(X,·)(Y ) with the modified public key. If the forger
asks its oracle to sign a message M = (mn−1, . . . ,m0) and if ma = 1 − b, then the
adversary, playing the role of the oracle, signs the message and returns the signature.
The adversary can sign this message since he knows the original key pair and because
of ma = 1− b, the modified string in the public key is not used. However, if ma = b
then the adversary cannot sign M . So his answer to the oracle query is failure
which also causes the forger to abort. If the forger’s oracle query was successful
or if the forger does not ask the oracle at all the forger may produce a message
M ′ = (m′n−1, . . . ,m
′
0) and the signature (σ
′
n−1, . . . , σ
′
0) of that message. If m
′
a = b,
then σ′a is the preimage of y which the adversary returns. Otherwise, the adversary
returns failure. More formally, the adversary is presented in Algorithm 6.1.
Algorithm 6.1 AdvPre
Input: k
$
←− K and y = fk(x), where x
$
←− {0, 1}n
Output: x′ such that y = fk(x) or failure
1. Generate an LD–OTS key pair (X,Y ).
2. Choose a
$
←− {0, . . . , n− 1} and b
$
←− {0, 1}.
3. Replace ya[b] by y in the LD–OTS verification key Y .
4. Run ForO(X,·)(Y ).
5. When ForO(X,·)(Y ) asks its only oracle query with M = (mn−1, . . . ,m0):
a) if ma = (1 − b) then sign M and respond to the forger For
O(X,·)(Y )
with the signature σ.
b) else return failure.
6. When ForO(X,·)(Y ) outputs a valid signature σ′ = (σ′n−1, . . . , σ
′
0) for message
M ′ = (m′0, . . . ,m
′
n−1):
a) if m′a = b then return σ
′
a as preimage of y.
b) else return failure.
We now compute the success probability of the adversary AdvPre. We denote
by ǫ the forger’s success probability for producing an existential forgery of the LD–
OTS and by t its running time. By tGen and tSig we denote the times the LD–OTS
requires for key and signature generation, respectively.
The adversary AdvPre is successful in finding a preimage of y if and only if the
forger ForO(X,·)(Y ) queries the oracle with a message M = (mn−1, . . . ,m0) with
ma = (1− b) (Line 5a) or if he queries the oracle not at all and if the forger returns
a valid signature for message M ′ = (m′0, . . . ,m
′
n−1) with m
′
a = b (Line 6a). Since b
is selected randomly with the uniform distribution, the probability for ma = (1− b)
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is 1/2. Since M ′ must be different from the queried message M , there exists at least
one index c such that m′c = 1 −mc. AdvPre is successful if c = a, which happens
with probability at least 1/2n. Hence, the adversary’s success probability for finding
a preimage in a time tow = t + tSig + tGen, is at least ǫ/4n. We have proved the
following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Let n ∈ N, let K be a finite parameter set, let tow, ǫow be positive
real numbers, and F =
{
fk : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
be a family of (tow, ǫow) one-
way functions. Then the LD–OTS variant that uses F is (tots, ǫots, 1) existentially
unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks with ǫots ≤ 4n · ǫow and tots =
tow − tSig − tGen where tGen and tSig are the key generation and signing times of
LD–OTS, respectively.
6.1.2 Security reduction for Merkle’s tree authentication scheme
This section discusses the security of the Merkle signature scheme. We modify the
Merkle scheme slightly. Select a security parameter n ∈ N . Let K = K(n) be a
finite set of parameters. Let
G =
{
gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
be a family of hash functions. The key generation of the modified MSS works as
follows. On input of 1n for a security parameter n a key k ∈ K(n) is selected
randomly with the uniform distribution. Then the Merkle signature scheme is used
with the hash function gk and some one-time signature scheme. The secret and
public keys are generated as described in Section 2.2. The parameter k is included
in the public key. We show that the existential unforgeability of this MSS variant
under adaptive chosen message attacks can be reduced to the collision resistance of
the family G and the existential unforgeability of the underlying one-time signature
scheme.
We explain how an existential forger for the Merkle signature scheme can be used
to construct an adversary that is either an existential forger for the underlying one-
time signature scheme or a collision finder for a hash function in G. The adversary
takes as input a one-time signature scheme, a key k ∈ K chosen randomly with the
uniform distribution, and the Merkle tree height H. The adversary also takes as in-
put a verification key YOTS and a signing oracle OOTS(XOTS, ·), where (XOTS, YOTS)
is a key pair of the one-time signature scheme.
The adversary is allowed to query the oracle OOTS(XOTS, ·) once. His goal is to
output a collision for the hash function gk or an existential forgery (M
′, σ′) for the
one-time signature scheme that can be verified using the verification key YOTS. He
has access to an adaptive chosen message forger ForO(sk,·)(pk) for the MSS with
hash function gk and tree height H. The forger is allowed to ask 2
H queries to its
signature oracle. The adversary is supposed to impersonate that oracle.
The adversary selects randomly with the uniform distribution an index c in the set
{0, . . . , 2H − 1}. He generates a MSS key pair as usual with the only exception that
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as the cth one-time verification key the one-time verification key YOTS from the input
is used. Then the adversary invokes the adaptive chosen message forger for MSS
with the hash function gk and the MSS public key which he just generated. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the forger queries the oracle 2H times. The oracle
answers are given by the adversary. When the forger asks for the ith signature,
i 6= c, then the adversary produces this signatures using the signature keys which he
generated before. However, when the forger asks for the cth signature, the adversary
queries the oracle OOTS(XOTS, ·). Suppose that the forger is successful and outputs
an existential forgery (M ′, (s, σ′, Y ′, A′)) where s is the index of the one-time key
pair used for this signature, σ′ is the one-time signature, Y ′ is the verification key
and A′ is the authentication path. The adversary examines the Merkle signature
(s, σ, Y,A) of M he returned in response to the forgers sth oracle query.
If s = c and (Y,A) = (Y ′, A′), then the adversary returns (M ′, σ′). We show that
this is an existential forgery of the one-time signature scheme with verification key
YOTS. Since s = c we have Y
′ = Y = YOTS. So the one-time signature σ
′ can be
verified using the one-time verification key YOTS. We also know that M 6=M
′ holds
and therefore (M ′, σ′) is an existential forgery of the one-time signature scheme with
verification key YOTS.
Algorithm 6.2 AdvCR,OTS
Input: Key for the hash function k
$
←− K, height of the tree H ≥ 2, one instance
of the underlying OTS consisting of a verification key YOTS and the corresponding
signing oracle OOTS(XOTS, ·).
Output: A collision of gk, an existential forgery for the supplied instance of the
OTS, or failure
1. Set c
$
←− {0, . . . , 2H − 1}.
2. Generate OTS key pairs (Xj , Yj), j = 0, . . . , 2
H − 1, j 6= c and set Yc ← YOTS.
3. Complete the Merkle key pair generation and obtain (sk, pk).
4. Run ForO(sk,·)(pk).
5. When ForO(sk,·)(pk) asks its qth oracle query (0≤q≤2H−1):
a) if q = c then query the signing oracle OOTS(XOTS, ·).
b) else compute the one-time signature σ using the qth signature key Xq.
c) Return the corresponding Merkle signature to the forger.
6. If the forger outputs an existential forgery (M ′, (s, σ′, Y ′, A′)), examine the
Merkle signature (s, σ, Y,A) returned in response to the forgers sth oracle
query.
a) if (Y ′, A′) 6= (Y,A) then return a collision of gk.
b) else
i. if s = c then return (M ′, σ′) as forgery for the supplied instance of
the one-time signature scheme.
ii. else return failure.
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If (Y,A) 6= (Y ′, A′), then the adversary can construct a collision for the hash
function gk as follows. Consider the path B = (B0 = gk(Y ), B1, . . . , BH) from
Y in the Merkle tree to its root constructed using the hash function gk and the
authentication path A = (A0, . . . , AH−1). Compare it to the path B
′ = (B′0 =
gk(Y
′), B′1, . . . , B
′
H) from Y
′ in the Merkle tree to its root constructed using the
authentication path A′ = (A′0, . . . , A
′
H−1). First assume that B and B
′ are different.
For example, this is true when Y 6= Y ′. Since BH = B
′
H is the MSS public key,
there is an index 0 ≤ i < H with Bi+1 = B
′
i+1 and Bi 6= B
′
i. Since Bi+1 is
the hash value of the concatenation of Bi and Ai (in the appropriate order), and
since B′i+1 is the hash value of the concatenation of B
′
i and A
′
i (in the appropriate
order), a collision of gk is found. Next, assume that B and B
′ are equal. Therefore
gk(Y ) = B0 = B
′
0 = gk(Y
′) holds. If Y 6= Y ′ a collision is found. If Y = Y ′ then A
and A′ are different. Assume that Ai 6= A
′
i for some index i < H. Since Bi+1 is the
hash value of the concatenation of Bi and Ai (in the appropriate order), and since
B′i+1 is the hash value of the concatenation of B
′
i and A
′
i (in the appropriate order)
again a collision is found. That collision is returned by the adversary. In all other
cases the adversary returns failure. Algorithm 6.2 summarizes our description.
We now estimate the success probability of the adversary AdvCR,OTS. In the
following, ǫ denotes the success probability and t the running time of the forger.
Also, tGen, tSig, and tVer denote the times MSS requires for key generation, signature
generation, and verification, respectively.
If (Y ′, A′) 6= (Y,A), then the adversary returns collision. His (conditional) prob-
ability ǫcr for returning a collision in a time tcr = t + 2
H · tSig + tVer + tGen is at
least ǫ. If (Y ′, A′) = (Y,A) the adversary returns an existential forgery if s = c. His
(conditional) probability ǫots for finding an existential forgery with verification key
YOTS in a time tots = t+2
H · tSig + tVer + tGen is at least ǫ · 1/2
H . Since both cases
are mutually exclusive, one of them occurs with probability at least 1/2. So we have
proved the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2. Let K be a finite set, let H ∈ N, tcr, tots, ǫcr, ǫots ∈ R>0, ǫcr ≤ 1/2,
ǫots ≤ 1/2
H+1, and let G =
{
gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
be a family of (tcr, ǫcr)
collision resistant hash functions. Consider MSS using a (tots, ǫots, 1) one-time
signature scheme. Then MSS is a (t, ǫ, 2H) signature scheme with
ǫ ≤ 2 ·max
{
ǫcr, 2
H · ǫots
}
(6.5)
t = min
{
tcr, tots
}
− 2H · tSig − tVer − tGen. (6.6)
This theorem tell us that if there is no adversary that can break the collision
resistance of the family G in a time at most tcr with probability greater than ǫcr and
there is no adversary that is able to produce an existential forgery for the one-time
signature scheme used in MSS in a time at most tots with probability greater than
ǫots, then there exists no forger for MSS running in a time at most min
{
tcr, tots
}
−
2H · tSig − tVer − tGen and success probability greater then 2 ·max
{
ǫcr, 2
H · ǫots
}
.
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6.1.3 Security level of the Merkle signature scheme
The goal of this section is to estimate the security level of the Merkle signature
scheme when used with the Lamport–Diffie one-time signature scheme for a given
output length n of the hash function. Let b ∈ N. We say that MSS has security level
2b if the expected number of hash function evaluations required for the generation
of an existential forgery is at least 2b. This security level can be computed as t/ǫ
where t is the running time of an existential forger and ǫ is its success probability.
We also say that the signature scheme has b bits of security or that the bit security
is b. In this section let ǫcr, tcr, ǫow, tow ∈ R>0, let K be a finite set, and let
G =
{
gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
(6.7)
be a family of (tcr, ǫcr) collision resistant and (tow, ǫow) preimage resistant hash
functions.
Since we consider MSS using LD-OTS, we first combine Theorems 6.1 and 6.2.
This is achieved by substituting the values for ǫots and tots from Theorem 6.1 in
Equations (6.5) and (6.6) from Theorem 6.2. This yields
ǫ ≤ 2 ·max
{
ǫcr, 2
H · 4n · ǫow
}
(6.8)
t = min
{
tcr, tow
}
− 2H · tSig − tVer − tGen. (6.9)
Note that we can replace tots by tow rather than tow−tSig−tGen, since the time LD-
OTS requires for signature and key generation is already included in the signature
and key generation time of the MSS in Theorem 6.2. We also require ǫcr ≤ 1/2 and
ǫow ≤ 1/(2
H+1 · 4n) to ensure ǫ ≤ 1.
To estimate the security level, we need explicit values for the key pair generation,
signature generation and verification times of MSS using LD-OTS. We will use the
following upper bounds.
tGen ≤ 2
H · 6n, tSig ≤ 4n(H + 1), tVer ≤ n+H (6.10)
We also make assumptions for the values of (tcr, ǫcr) and (tow, ǫow). We distin-
guish between attacks that use classical computers only and attacks with quantum
computers.
Using classical computers. In our security analysis of MSS we assume that the
hash functions under consideration have output length n and only admit generic
attacks against their preimage and collision resistance. Those generic attacks are
exhaustive search and the birthday attack. When classical computers are used,
then a birthday attack that inspects 2n/2 hash values has a success probability of
approximately 1/2. We therefore assume that our hash functions are
(tcr, ǫcr) = (2
n/2, 1/2) (6.11)
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collision resistant. Also, an exhaustive search of 2n/2 random strings yields a preim-
age of a given hash value with probability 1/2n/2. We therefore assume that our
hash functions are
(tow, ǫow) = (2
n/2, 1/2n/2) (6.12)
preimage resistant. In this situation, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3 (Classical case). The security level of the Merkle signature scheme
combined with the Lamport-Diffie one-time signature scheme is at least
b = n/2− 1 (6.13)
if the height of the Merkle tree is at most H ≤ n/3 and the output length of the hash
function is at least n ≥ 87.
To prove Theorem 6.3 we use our assumption and Equations (6.8) and (6.9) and
obtain the following estimate for the security level.
t
ǫ
≥
2n/2 − 2H · tSig − tVer − tGen
2 ·max{1/2, 2H · 4n · 1/2n/2}
. (6.14)
Using H ≤ n/3, the maximum in the denominator is 1/2 as long as
n/3 ≤ n/2− log2 4n− 1 (6.15)
which holds for n ≥ 53. Using the upper bounds for tSig, tVer, and tGen estimated
above, Equation (6.14) implies
t
ǫ
≥ 2n/2 − 2H · 4n(H + 1)− (n+H)− 2H · 6n. (6.16)
Using H ≤ n/3, the desired lower bound for the security level of 2n/2−1 holds as
long as
2n/3(4/3 · n2 + 4n) + 4/3 · n+ 2n/3 · 6n ≤ 2n/2−1 (6.17)
which is true for n ≥ 87.
Using quantum computers. Again, we assume that our hash functions have out-
put length n and only admit generic attacks against their collision and preimage
resistance. However, when quantum computers are available, the Grover algorithm
[21] can be used in those generic attacks. Grovers algorithm requires 2n/3 evalua-
tions of the hash function to find a collision with probability at most 1/2. So we
assume that our hash functions are
(tcr, ǫcr) = (2
n/3, 1/2) (6.18)
collision resistant. By virtue of Grover’s algorithm we may also assume that our
hash functions are
(tow, ǫow) = (2
n/3, 1/2n/3) (6.19)
preimage resistant, see [6] Chapter 2 “Quantum computing”. In this situation, we
prove the following theorem.
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Theorem 6.4 (Quantum case). The security level of the Merkle signature scheme
combined with the Lamport-Diffie one-time signature scheme is at least
b = n/3− 1 (6.20)
if the height of the Merkle tree is at most H ≤ n/4 and the output length of the hash
function is at least n ≥ 196.
To prove Theorem 6.4 we use the same approach as for the proof of Theorem
6.3. We use our assumption on the hash function and Equations (6.8) and (6.9) and
obtain the following estimate for the security level.
t
ǫ
≥
2n/3 − 2H · tSig − tVer − tGen
2 ·max{1/2, 2H · 4n · 1/2n/3}
. (6.21)
Using H ≤ n/4, the maximum in the denominator is 1/2 as long as
n/4 ≤ n/3− log2 4n− 1 (6.22)
which holds for n ≥ 119. Using the upper bounds for tSig, tVer, and tGen estimated
above, Equation (6.21) implies
t
ǫ
≥ 2n/3 − 2H · 4n(H + 1)− (n+H)− 2H · 6n. (6.23)
Using H ≤ n/4, the desired lower bound for the security level of 2n/3−1 holds as
long as
2n/4(n2 + 4n) + 5/4 · n+ 2n/4 · 6n ≤ 2n/3−1 (6.24)
which is true for n ≥ 196.
6.2 Merkle signatures based on second-preimage resistance
According to the last section, the security level of MSS combined with LD-OTS is
determined by the collision resistance of the hash function family. Recent attacks on
the collision resistance of popular hash functions such as MD5 and SHA1 indicate
that collision resistance is a hard to achieve goal. We will now describe a different
construction method for Merkle trees that adds randomness to each inner node. We
call the resulting signature scheme SPR-MSS [17]. Then we show that SPR-MSS is
existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks as long as the used
hash function is second-preimage resistant and the underlying one-time signature
scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks. In the
following, let
G =
{
gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
be a family of hash functions.
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6.2.1 The SPR-MSS construction
In this section we describe the new construction method for the Merkle authentica-
tion tree, which is inspired by the XOR-tree proposed in [5]. We call the resulting
tree SPR-Merkle tree. The new construction differs from the original construction
in two ways.
1. A leaf of the SPR-Merkle tree is not the hash value of the concatenation of
the bit strings in the one-time verification key, but the bit strings themselves.
The SPR-Merkle tree is constructed starting directly from these bit strings.
2. Before applying the hash function to the concatenation of two child nodes
to compute their parent, both child nodes are xored with a randomly chosen
mask.
SPR-MSS also uses the parameter H ≥ 2 to decide on the number of signatures
that can be generated with one key pair, i.e. 2H many. In the following, we assume
that each one-time verification key consists of 2l bit strings of length n. Since there
are 2H one-time verification keys, a SPR-Merkle tree has 2H+l leaves and height
H + l. The nodes are denoted by νh[j], where h = 0, . . . , H + l denotes the height
of the node in the tree (leaves have height 0 and the root has height H + l) and
j = 0, . . . , 2H+l−h−1 denotes the position of the node on that height, counting from
left to right.
νH+l[0]
ν0[s2
l] ν0[s2
l+2l−1]
νl[0] νl[s] νl[2
H − 1]
Figure 6.1: SPR-Merkle tree
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The sth verification key Ys contains 2
l leaves of the SPR-Merkle tree denoted by
ν0[s2
l], . . . , ν0[s2
l+2l−1]. These leaves can be used to compute the inner node νl[s]
on height l. Unlike in the original MSS, where the signer includes the authentication
path for the sth leaf in the signature, the signer now has to include an authentication
path for the inner node νl[s]. Figure 6.1 shows an example of an SPR-Merkle tree.
Remark 6.5. In case the number of bit strings L in the verification keys of the
chosen OTS is not a power of 2, the resulting SPR-Merkle tree has height H +
⌈log2 L⌉. The SPR-Merkle tree is constructed such that the subtrees below the 2
H
nodes νh[j] are unbalanced trees of height ⌈log2 L⌉.
For the construction of inner nodes we choose two masks
vh[0], vh[1] ∈R {0, 1}
n (6.25)
for each height h = 1, . . . , H + l uniform at random. When constructing an inner
node on height h, its left child on height is xored with vh[0] and its right child is
xored with vh[1]. Then the results are concatenated and the hash function is applied.
The construction rule for inner nodes of an SPR-Merkle tree is
νh[j] = gk
((
νh−1[2j]⊕ vh[0]
)
‖
(
νh−1[2j + 1]⊕ vh[1]
))
(6.26)
for h = 1, . . . , H + l and j = 0, . . . , 2H+l−h − 1. The computation of inner nodes is
visualized in Figure 6.2.
νh−1[2j] νh−1[2j+1]
νh[j]
vh[0] vh[1]
gk
Figure 6.2: Construction of inner nodes in a SPR-Merkle tree
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SPR-MSS key pair generation. The key pair generation works as follows. First
choose H ≥ 2. Next compute 2H one-time key pairs (Xj , Yj), for j = 0, . . . , 2
H − 1,
where each one-time verification key consists of 2l bit stings of length n. Then choose
a key for the hash function k ∈R K and masks vh[0], vh[1] ∈R {0, 1}
n uniformly at
random for h = 1, . . . , H + l. The SPR-MSS private key consists of the 2H one-time
signature keys Xj or the seed for PRNG used to generate them (see Section 2.4).
The SPR-MSS public key consists of the key for the hash function k, the XOR masks
v1[0], v1[1], . . . , vH+l[0], vH+l[1], and the root νH+l[0]. The root of the SPR-Merkle
tree is generated using the treehash algorithm of Section 2.3. This algorithm must
be adjusted such that it correctly computes inner nodes using the masks vh[0], vh[1].
Compared to the original MSS, SPR-MSS key pair generation requires 2H(2l − 2)
additional evaluations of the hash function and 2H(2l+1−2) additional XOR compu-
tations to compute the inner nodes νl[0], . . . , νl[2
H−1]. Further, 2H+1−2 additional
XOR operations are required to compute the root νH+l[0]. The size of the private
key doesn’t change. The SPR-MSS public key also contains the XOR masks. Hence
its size increases by 2(H + l) · n bits.
SPR-MSS signature generation. The SPR-MSS signature generation is very sim-
ilar to the MSS signature generation described in Section 2.2. To sign a message M ,
the signer first computes its n-bit digest d. Then he generates the one-time signature
σOTS of the digest using the sth one-time signature key Xs, s ∈ {0, . . . , 2
H − 1}.
The SPR-MSS signature contains this one-time signature and the corresponding
one-time verification key Ys. The signature also contains the authentication path
As = (a0, . . . , aH−1) for inner node νl[s] on height l given as
ah =
{
νh+l[s/2
h − 1] , if ⌊s/2h⌋ ≡ 1 mod 2
νh+l[s/2
h + 1] , if ⌊s/2h⌋ ≡ 0 mod 2
(6.27)
for h = 0, . . .H − 1. The respective algorithm used for the computation of the
authentication paths must be adjusted such that it correctly computes inner nodes
using the masks vh[0], vh[1]. In total, the sth SPR-MSS signature is given as
σs =
(
s, σOTS, Ys, As)
)
. (6.28)
Compared to the original MSS, SPR-MSS signature generation requires two ad-
ditional XOR operations for each inner node of the SPR-Merkle tree that must be
computed during signature generation, e.g. by the authentication path algorithm.
SPR-MSS signature verification. The verification of a SPR-MSS signature is also
quite similar to the MSS signature verification. First the verifier verifies the one-time
signature of message M using the supplied verification key Ys and the verification
algorithm of the respective one-time signature scheme.
Then he verifies the authenticity of Ys as follows: first he uses the 2
l bit strings
in Ys = (ν0[s2
l], . . . , ν0[s2
l + 2l − 1]) to compute the inner node νl[s] on height l as
follows
νh[j] = gk
(
νh−1[2j]⊕ vh[0] ‖ νh−1[2j + 1]⊕ vh[1]
)
(6.29)
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for h = 1, . . . , l and j = s2l−h, . . . , s2l−h+2l−h−1. Then he uses the authentication
path As and recomputes the path from νl[s] to the root νH+l[0] as
ph =


gk
((
ah−1 ⊕ vh[0]
)
‖
(
ph−1 ⊕ vh[1]
))
, if ⌊s/2h−1⌋ ≡ 1 mod 2
gk
((
ph−1 ⊕ vh[0]
)
‖
(
ah−1 ⊕ vh[1]
))
, if ⌊s/2h−1⌋ ≡ 0 mod 2
(6.30)
for h = 1, . . .H and p0 = νl[s]. The signature is valid if pH equals the signers public
root νH+l[0] and the verification of the one-time signature is successful.
Compared to the original MSS, SPR-MSS signature verification requires 2l−2 ad-
ditional evaluations of the hash function and 2l+1−2 additional XOR computations
to compute the node νl[s]. Further, 2H additional XOR operations are required to
recompute the path from νl[s] to the root νH+l[0].
6.2.2 Security reduction for SPR-MSS
We now reduce the existential unforgeability of SPR-MSS under adaptive chosen
message attacks to the second preimage resistance of the hash function family
G =
{
gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
and the existential unforgeability of the underlying one-time signature scheme. The
reduction is similar to the reduction for the original MSS explained in Section
6.1.2. The difference is, that the randomly chosen masks vh[0], vh[1] ∈R {0, 1}
n, h =
1, . . . , H + l allow us to insert a predefined first preimage into the SPR Merkle tree.
If a collision is found at the right position, this yields the desired second preimage.
We now explain the details of the reduction, i.e. how an existential forger for SPR-
MSS can be used to construct an adversary that is either an existential forger for the
underlying one-time signature scheme or a second preimage finder for a hash function
in G. The adversary takes as input a key k ∈ K and a first preimage x ∈R {0, 1}
2n
both chosen randomly with the uniform distribution and the SPR-Merkle tree height
H. The adversary also takes as input a one-time signature scheme, a verification
key YOTS and a signing oracle OOTS(XOTS, ·), where (XOTS, YOTS) is a key pair of
the one-time signature scheme.
The adversary is allowed to query the oracle OOTS(XOTS, ·) once. His goal is to
output a second preimage of x under gk or an existential forgery (M
′, σ′) for the
one-time signature scheme that can be verified using the verification key YOTS. He
has access to an adaptive chosen message forger ForO(sk,·)(pk) for the SPR-MSS
with hash function gk and tree height H. The forger is allowed to ask 2
H queries to
its signature oracle. The adversary is supposed to impersonate that oracle.
The adversary selects randomly with the uniform distribution an index c in the
set {0, . . . , 2H−1}. He generates one-time verification keys (Xj , Yj), j = 0, . . . , 2
H−
1, j 6= c in the usual manner with the exception that as cth one-time verification
key the one-time verification key YOTS from the input is used. The adversary now
executes the necessary steps to include the first preimage x in the SPR-Merkle
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tree. He chooses randomly with the uniform distribution a tuple (a, b) in the set{
(h, j) : h ∈ {1, . . . , H + l}, j ∈ {0, . . . , 2H+l−h − 1}
}
. The adversary then chooses
masks vh[0], vh[1] ∈R {0, 1}
n, h = 1, . . . , H + l, h 6= a randomly with the uniform
distribution. The adversary then constructs the SPR-Merkle tree up to height a− 1
such that he knows the nodes νa−1[2b], νa−1[2b + 1]. He then computes the masks
va[0], va[1] as
va[0] ‖ va[1] = x⊕
(
νa−1[2b] ‖ νa−1[2b+ 1]
)
. (6.31)
Then x =
(
νa−1[2b]⊕va[0]
)
‖
(
νa−1[2b+1]⊕va[1]
)
and therefore ya[b] = gk(x) holds.
Finally the adversary uses va[0], va[1] to complete the key pair generation. Note that
the masks va[0], va[1] are indistinguishable from bit strings chosen randomly with
the uniform distribution because x was chosen chosen randomly with the uniform
distribution. As a consequence, the adversary AdvSPR,OTS creates an environment
identical to the signature forging game played by the forger.
The next steps are the same as in the security reduction for the original MSS
explained in Section 6.1.2 The adversary invokes the adaptive chosen message forger
for SPR-MSS with hash function gk and the public SPR-MSS key which he generated
before. Without loss of generality, we assume that the forger queries the oracle 2H
times. The oracle answers are given by the adversary. When the forger asks for
the ith signature, i 6= c, then the adversary produces this signatures using the
signature keys which he generated before. However, when the forger asks for the cth
signature, the adversary queries the oracle OOTS(XOTS, ·). Suppose that the forger
is successful and outputs an existential forgery (M ′, (s, σ′, Y ′, A′)) where s is the
index of the one-time key pair used for this signature, σ′ is the one-time signature,
Y ′ is the verification key and A′ is the authentication path. The adversary examines
the SPR-MSS signature (s, σ, Y,A) of M he returned in response to the forgers sth
oracle query.
If s = c and (Y,A) = (Y ′, A′), then the adversary returns (M ′, σ′) as existential
forgery of the one-time signature scheme with verification key YOTS as described in
Section 6.1.2.
If (Y,A) 6= (Y ′, A′) the adversary can find a collision as described in Section 6.1.2.
This collision can occur either during the computation of the inner node νl[s] from
the leaves ν0[s2
l], . . . , ν0[s2
l + 2l − 1] or during the computation of the path from
νl[s] to the root νH+l[0]. If the collision occurs at node νa[b], i.e. νa[b] = gk(x
′) with
x′ 6= x, the adversary outputs x′ as second preimage of x under gk.
In all other cases, the adversary returns failure. Algorithm 6.3 summarizes our
description.
We now estimate the success probability of the adversary AdvSPR,OTS. As be-
fore, ǫ denotes the success probability and t the running time of the forger. Also,
tGen, tSig, and tVer denote the times SPR-MSS requires for key generation, signature
generation, and verification, respectively.
If (Y ′, A′) 6= (Y,A), then the adversary finds a collision. Since the position of
node νa[b] was chosen at randomly with the uniform distribution, the probability
that the collision occurs precisely at this position is at least 1/(2H+l − 1). The
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Algorithm 6.3 AdvSPR,OTS
Input: Key for the hash function k
$
←− K, height of the tree H ≥ 2, first-preimage
x ∈R {0, 1}
2n, one instance of the underlying OTS consisting of a verification key
YOTS and the corresponding signing oracle OOTS(XOTS, ·).
Output: Second-preimage x′ ∈ {0, 1}2n with x′ 6= x and gk(x) = gk(x
′), an exis-
tential forgery for the supplied instance of the OTS, or failure
1. Set c
$
←− {0, . . . , 2h − 1}.
2. Generate OTS key pairs (Xj , Yj), j = 0, . . . , 2
H − 1, j 6= c and set Yc ← YOTS.
3. Set (a, b)
$
←−
{
(h, j) : h ∈ {1, . . . , H + l}, j ∈ {0, . . . , 2H+l−h − 1}
}
.
4. Choose random masks vh[0], vh[1]
$
←− {0, 1}n, h = 1, . . . , H + l, h 6= a.
5. Construct the SPR-Merkle tree up to height a− 1.
6. Compute (va[0] ‖ va[1])← x⊕
(
νa−1[2b] ‖ νa−1[2b+ 1]
)
.
7. Use va[0], va[1] to complete the key pair generation.
8. Run ForO(sk,·)(pk).
9. When ForO(sk,·)(pk) asks its qth oracle query (0 ≤ q ≤ 2H − 1):
a) if q = c then query the signing oracle O(sk, ·).
b) else compute the one-time signature σ using the qth signature key Xq.
c) Return the corresponding SPR-Merkle signature to the forger.
10. If the forger outputs an existential forgery (M ′, (s, σ′, Y ′, A′)), examine the
Merkle signature (s, σ, Y,A) returned in response to the forgers sth oracle
query.
a) if (Y ′, A′) 6= (Y,A):
i. if νa[b] is computed during the verification as νa[b] = gk(x
′) and
x′ 6= x holds then return x′ as second-preimage of x.
ii. else return failure.
b) else
i. if s = c then return (M ′, σ′) as forgery for the supplied instance of
the one-time signature scheme.
ii. else return failure.
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adversary’s (conditional) probability ǫspr for returning a second preimage in a time
tspr = t + 2
H · tSig + tVer + tGen is at least ǫ/(2
H+l − 1). If (Y ′, A′) = (Y,A) the
adversary returns an existential forgery if s = c. His (conditional) probability ǫots
for finding an existential forgery in a time tots = t + 2
H · tSig + tVer + tGen is at
least ǫ · 1/2H . Since both cases are mutually exclusive, one of them occurs with
probability at least 1/2. So we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 6.6. Let K be a finite set, let H ∈ N, tspr, tots, ǫspr, ǫots ∈ R>0, ǫspr ≤
1/(2H+l+1 − 2), ǫots ≤ 1/2
H+1, and let G =
{
gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
be a
family of (tspr, ǫspr) second preimage resistant hash functions. Consider SPR-MSS
using a (tots, ǫots, 1) one-time signature scheme. Then SPR-MSS is a (t, ǫ, 2
H)
signature scheme with
ǫ ≤ 2 ·max
{
(2H+l − 1) · ǫspr, 2
H · ǫots
}
(6.32)
t = min
{
tspr, tots
}
− 2H · tSig − tVer − tGen. (6.33)
6.2.3 Security level of SPR-MSS
In this section we compute the security level of SPR-MSS when used with the
Lamport–Diffie one-time signature scheme (LD-OTS). The computation is similar
to what was done in Section 6.1.3. We express security level as t/ǫ where t is the
running time of an existential forger and ǫ is its success probability. In this section
let ǫspr, tspr, ǫow, tow ∈ R>0, let K be a finite set, and let
G =
{
gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
(6.34)
be a family of (tspr, ǫspr) second preimage resistant and (tow, ǫow) preimage resistant
hash functions.
Since we consider SPR-MSS using LD-OTS, we first combine Theorem 6.1 and
Theorem 6.6. This is achieved by substituting the values for ǫots and tots from The-
orem 6.1 in Equations (6.32) and (6.33) from Theorem 6.6. An LD-OTS verification
key consists of 2n = 2log2 2n bit strings of length n (see Section 2.1.1). We therefore
have l = log2 2n. In summary we get
ǫ ≤ 2 ·max
{
(2H+log2 2n − 1) · ǫspr, 2
H+log2 4n · ǫow
}
(6.35)
t = min
{
tspr, tow
}
− 2H · tSig − tVer − tGen. (6.36)
Again we replace tots by tow rather than tow − tSig − tGen, since the time LD-OTS
requires for signature and key generation is already included in the signature and
key generation time of SPR-MSS in Theorem 6.6. To ensure ǫ ≤ 1, we require
ǫspr ≤ 1/(2
H+log2 2n+1 − 2), ǫow ≤ 1/(2
H+log2 4n).
To estimate the security level, we need explicit values for the key pair generation,
signature generation and verification times of SPR-MSS using LD-OTS. We use the
upper bounds from Equation (6.10).
tGen ≤ 2
H · 6n, tSig ≤ 4n(H + 1), tVer ≤ n+H
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Again we make assumptions for the values of (tspr, ǫspr) and (tow, ǫow) and distin-
guish between attacks that use classical computers only and attacks with quantum
computers.
Using classical computers. In our security analysis of SPR-MSS we assume that
the hash functions under consideration have output length n and only admit generic
attacks against their preimage and second preimage resistance. The best generic
attack to find preimages or second preimages is exhaustive search. An exhaustive
search of 2n−H−log2 4n−1 random strings yields a preimage of a given hash value with
probability 1/2H+log2 4n+1. We therefore assume that our hash functions are
(tow, ǫow) = (2
n−H−log2 4n−1, 1/2H+log2 4n+1) (6.37)
preimage resistant. Also, an exhaustive search of 2n−H−log2 4n−1 random strings
yields a second preimage of a given first preimage with probability 1/2H+log2 4n+1.
We therefore assume that our hash functions are
(tspr, ǫspr) = (2
n−H−log2 4n−1, 1/2H+log2 4n+1) (6.38)
second preimage resistant. In this situation, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.7 (Classical case). The security level of SPR-MSS combined with the
Lamport–Diffie one-time signature scheme is at least
b = 2/3 · n− log2 n− 4 (6.39)
if the height of the Merkle tree is at most H ≤ n/3 and the output length of the hash
function is at least n ≥ 69.
To prove Theorem 6.7 we use our assumption and Equations (6.35) and (6.36)
and obtain the following estimate for the security level.
t
ǫ
≥
2n−H−log2 4n−1 − 2H · tSig − tVer − tGen
2 ·max
{
2H+log2 2n−1
2H+log2 4n+1
, 2
H+log2 4n
2H+log2 4n+1
} . (6.40)
The maximum in the denominator is 1/2 for any choice of n and H. Using the upper
bounds for tSig, tVer, and tGen estimated above, Equation (6.40) implies
t
ǫ
≥ 2n−H−log2 4n−1 − 2H · 4n(H + 1)− (n+H)− 2H · 6n. (6.41)
Using H ≤ n/3, the desired lower bound for the security level of 2/3 · n− log2 n− 4
holds as long as
2n/3(4/3 · n2 + 4n) + 4/3 · n+ 2n/3 · 6n ≤ 22n/3−log2 n−4 (6.42)
which is true for n ≥ 69.
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Using quantum computers. Again, we assume that our hash functions have output
length n and only admit generic attacks against their preimage and second preimage
resistance. Again, we use the Grover algorithm [21] in those generic attacks. By
virtue of Grover’s algorithm we may assume that our hash functions are
(tow, ǫow) = (2
n/2−(H+log2 4n+1)/2, 1/2H+log 4n+1) (6.43)
preimage resistant and
(tspr, ǫspr) = (2
n/2−(H+log2 4n+1)/2, 1/2H+log 4n+1) (6.44)
second preimage resistant, see [6] Chapter 2 “Quantum computing”. In this situa-
tion, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.8 (Quantum case). The security level of SPR-MSS combined with the
Lamport-Diffie one-time signature scheme is at least
b = 3/8 · n− log4 n− 2 (6.45)
if the height of the Merkle tree is at most H ≤ n/4 and the output length of the hash
function is at least n ≥ 176.
To prove Theorem 6.8 we use the same approach as for the proof of Theorem 6.7.
We use our assumption on the hash function and Equations (6.35) and (6.36) and
obtain the following estimate for the security level.
t
ǫ
≥
2n/2−(H+log2 4n+1)/2 − 2H · tSig − tVer − tGen
2 ·max
{
2H+log2 2n−1
2H+log2 4n+1
, 2
H+log2 4n
2H+log2 4n+1
} . (6.46)
Again, the maximum in the denominator is 1/2 for any choice of n and H. Using
the upper bounds for tSig, tVer, and tGen estimated above, Equation (6.46) implies
t
ǫ
≥ 2n/2−(H+log2 4n+1)/2 − 2H · 4n(H + 1)− (n+H)− 2H · 6n. (6.47)
Using H ≤ n/4, the desired lower bound for the security level of 3/8 · n− log4 n− 2
holds as long as
2n/4(n2 + 4n) + 5/4 · n+ 2n/4 · 6n ≤ 23n/8−log4 n−3/2 − 23n/8−log4 n−2 (6.48)
which is true for n ≥ 176.
6.2.4 Signing arbitrarily long messages
In the security reduction of the Lamport–Diffie one-time signature scheme the length
of the message to be signed is limited to n bits (see Section 6.1.1). In real-world
applications this is not sufficient. In order to sign arbitrarily long messages, the
message is hashed to a n-bit string prior to signing and the hash value is signed (see
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Sections 2.1 and 2.2). To prevent trivial existential forgeries, the used hash function
must be collision resistant. In case of the original Merkle signature scheme this
is no additional restriction, because collision resistance is required for the security
reduction of the tree authentication scheme anyway (see Section 6.1.2). In other
words, Theorems 6.3 and 6.4 remain valid if the message to be signed is hashed
using a collision resistant hash function and the hash value is signed.
This does not hold in case of SPR-MSS which is specifically designed to eliminate
the necessity of collision resistance. So using a collision resistant hash function
for the initial hash of the message would decrease the security level estimated in
Theorems 6.7 and 6.8. In the following, we review a security notion that is weaker
than collision resistance but strong enough to prevent trivial existential forgeries.
Let
G =
{
gk : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}n|k ∈ K
}
(6.49)
be a family of hash functions and m a positive integer.
We define universal one-way hash functions (UOWHF), also known as target col-
lision resistance (TCR) hash functions [32, 5]. We use the definition from [35] where
this property is called everywhere second preimage resistant (eSec). TCR is defined
using a two stage adversary. In the beginning the adversary Adv commits to a
first preimage x ∈ {0, 1}m. In the next step a key k ∈ K is chosen randomly with
the uniform distribution and passed to the adversary that continues where it left
off. The adversary outputs a second preimage x′ of x or failure. The success
probability of this adversary is denoted by
Pr[x
$
←− Adv(), k
$
←− K,x′
$
←− Adv(k) : x 6= x′ ∧ gk(x) = gk(x
′)]. (6.50)
The TCR property is stronger that second preimage resistance because the adversary
gets to choose the first preimage. However, TCR is weaker than collision resistance,
because the adversary has to choose the first preimage before knowing under which
element of the family G it is supposed to find a second preimage. For that reason,
the birthday paradox cannot be used in generic attacks to break the TCR property
[32]. We finally remark that collision resistance implies TCR which in turn implies
second preimage resistance [35].
When using a TCR hash function with output length n for the initial hashing
of the message, the key k of this function must be signed as well. In [5], Bellare
and Rogaway show how a TCR hash function can be built from a d−to−1 TCR
compression function using the XOR construction we used for the SPR-Merkle tree.
In the following we use d = 2. Using this construction, the length of the key k
depends on the message length. If the message to be signed consists of b blocks of
length n, i.e. has bit length b · n, then the key k consists of is 2 · ⌈log2 b⌉+ 1 blocks
of length n. We need one n bit key for the compression function and 2 · ⌈log2 b⌉
random masks of bit length n for the XOR construction. Together with the n bit
digest of the message, 2n · (⌈log2 b⌉ + 1) bits must be signed. Even though the key
size depends only logarithmically on the message length it can be quite large. This
affects the size of the one-time signature as shown in the following example.
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Example 6.9. Suppose we use a TCR hash function with output length n = 128
and want to sign a message of size 16 MByte, i.e. a message that consists of 220
blocks of length 128 bit. The size of the key then is 128+ 2 · 128 · 20 = 5248 bits and
together with the 128 bit digest of the message, a total of 5376 bits must be signed.
When using the Lamport-Diffie one-time signature scheme, the size of the one-time
signature is 86,016 Bytes.
In order to solve the problem of long keys, Bellare and Rogaway suggested iterating
TCR hash functions [5]. For example, the TCR hash function can be iterated with
three different keys k1, k2 and k3 as explained in the following. Assume that a
message of length b · n bits is to be signed. As described above, the key k1 for the
first iteration consists of |k1| = 2 · ⌈log2 b⌉+1 blocks of length n. This key is hashed
in the second iteration together with the n bit output of the first iteration. So the
key k2 for the second iteration consists of
|k2| = 2 · ⌈log2(|k1|+ 1)⌉+ 1
blocks of length n. This key and the output of the second iteration are hashed in
the third iteration and therefore the key k3 consists of
|k3| = 2 · ⌈log2(|k2|+ 1)⌉+ 1
blocks of length n. Although the three keys must be transmitted with the signature,
only the third key k3 must be signed. So the size of the data to be signed is (|k3|+1)·n
bits. This process is depicted in Figure 6.3.
M
σ
Siggk1 gk2 gk3
k1 k2 k3
Figure 6.3: Iterating TCR hash functions
Iterating the TCR hash function drastically reduces the size of the one-time sig-
nature as shown in the following example.
Example 6.10. Suppose we use a TCR hash function with output length n = 128
and want to sign a 16 MByte message. We iterate the hash function three times.
The sizes of the keys k1, k2, k3 are
|k1| = 41 · 128 = 5248 bits.
|k2| = 13 · 128 = 1664 bits.
|k3| = 9 · 128 = 1152 bits.
The total size of the data to be signed is 1280 bits and when using the Lamport–Diffie
one-time signature scheme the size of the one-time signature is 20, 480 Bytes.
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6.3 Comparison of the security level
To conclude this chapter, we present explicit values for the security level of MSS and
SPR-MSS combined with the Lamport–Diffie one-time signature scheme for fixed
output lenghts of the hash function. These values are obtained using Theorems
6.3, 6.4, 6.7, and 6.8 and are summarized in Table 6.1. This table also shows the
maximum value for the height H of the tree such that the security level holds.
Table 6.1: Security level of MSS and SPR-MSS combined with LD-OTS in bits.
Output length n 128 160 224 256 384 512
Classical case
MSS bit security b 63 79 111 127 191 255
SPR-MSS bit security b 74 95 137 158 243 328
Maximum value for H 42 53 74 85 128 170
Quantum case
MSS bit security b − − 73 84 127 169
SPR-MSS bit security b − − 78 90 137 185
Maximum value for H − − 56 64 96 128
This table shows that the security reduction for the original MSS is very tight.
Only one bit of security is lost compared to the security level of the underlying hash
function against generic collision attacks. Unfortunately this is not true for SPR-
MSS. Although its security level is significantly higher than that of MSS, it does not
inherit the security level of the underlying hash function against generic preimage
and second preimage attacks. The reason for that is the low success probability
of the adversary described in Section 6.2.2, which in turn is the result of the low
probability that the forger produces a collision in the exact same tree node where
the first preimage was inserted. However, in practice second preimage resistance is
easier to achieve than collision resistance which is a great advantage of SPR-MSS.
To summarize, state of the art hash functions can be used to ensure a high security
level of the Merkle signature scheme, even against attacks by quantum computers.
For all practical applications the maximum height of the Merkle tree and the result-
ing number of messages that can be signed with one key pair is sufficiently large.
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This thesis introduces two enhancements for the Merkle signature scheme drastically
reducing the worst case signature generation time. The signature scheme using
these enhancements is called GMSS. The worst case signature generation time of
GMSS corresponds to the average case signature generation time of the Merkle
signature scheme combined with Szydlo’s and Coronado’s improvements. Further,
the worst case signature generation time of GMSS is extremely close to its average
case signature generation time. Hence, GMSS is the first Merkle type signature
scheme providing truly balanced timings. The improved signature generation times
of GMSS are exploited to provide a noticeable reduction of the signature sizes, while
maintaining timings highly competitive to RSA and ECDSA. This is illustrated
by explicit timings of two implementations, one in Java and one for 8-bit AVR
microcontrollers.
This thesis also introduces SPR-MSS, a signature scheme that in contrast to the
original MSS requires only second preimage resistant hash functions in order to
be existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks. Reducing the
requirements on the hash function significantly increases the security level.
In summary, there is now a signature scheme at our disposal not only efficient
enough to take over the place of RSA and ECDSA but also secure as long as cryp-
tographically secure hash functions exist. Contrary to RSA and ECDSA, large scale
quantum computers and innovative ideas leading to polynomial time algorithms for
solving number theoretic problems pose no threat to GMSS.
Further research. The main problem of the Merkle signature scheme still is the
signature size which is dominated by the size of the one-time signature. Although
the signature size is tolerable in most applications, it is desirable to have signature
sizes comparable to RSA. Therefore it is an important research goal to explore one-
time signature schemes providing small signature sizes and being resistant against
quantum computer attacks. The lattice based one-time signature scheme proposed
by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [28] presents a promising example.
Further research also includes more efficient implementations. GMSS is highly
parallelizable. This can be exploited when a multi-core CPU is available, which is
the case in state of the art PCs. For example, generating leaves essentially requires
t bit strings of length n to be hashed 2w times. So the computation of a leaf can
be done by t independent processes running in parallel. On dual-core systems this
would halve the time required for key pair generation, signature generation, and
verification. This speed-up can again be used to decrease the signature size.
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